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

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WHOSE SIN IS THE WORLD-WAR?

COUNT JULIUS ANDRÁSSY

WHOSE SIN IS THE WORLD-WAR?

TRANSLATED FROM THE HUNGARIAN

BY

ERNEST J. EUPHRAT

NEW ERA PUBLISHING HOUSE
NEW YORK
1915

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Oct 16 '16 D.T.H.

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Imperial + Royal Consulate of Austria-Hungary 8-21-169
Reclass. MVP. 3-10-36

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

COUNT JULIUS ANDRÁSSY (born in 1860 in Hungary) is the son of Austria-Hungary's great minister of foreign affairs of the same name, who lives in history as one of the towering figures of the nineteenth century. The author of this work, himself one of Hungary's great statesmen, former cabinet minister, who organized and led the coalition of 1906, relates in a calm, dispassionate and authoritative manner how the world-war really originated. No one better qualified has given the world a plainer story of primary facts, the rendering of which one would be tempted to term neutral, had not that word acquired a latter-day by-taste distorting its true meaning.

CHAPTER I

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

IN judging the course of any nation, the paramount question to be answered is not who carried the point in the last event of diplomatic contest, but rather who had interests at stake vital enough to go to war about, after adjustment in an amicable manner had become impossible.

Thus the righteousness of the Crimean war is not contingent on who was justified with regard to the claims set forth with reference to the various Christian churches of Jerusalem, but essentially whether the interests of England and France, threatened by Czar Nicholas' Eastern supremacy, were sufficiently important to be enforced by arms.

Neither should the estimate of justification in

the case of the Franco-Prussian war of '70–'71 hinge upon the decision as to who was right in the affair of the candidacy for the throne of Spain, or whether Emperor William I. did insult Benedetti at the Spa of Ems, but on whether it was right to engage in war as a means of securing the unity of Germany, or could she have attained that end without doing so.

The meritory question in the present struggle, too, is not decided by an answer as to whether or not our demand, that in certain cases Austro-Hungarian government organs may exercise extraterritorial authority within the borders of Servia, was a proper one to make, but as to whether our vital interests have been exposed to jeopardy great enough to resign ourselves to the only alternative left: The horror of war.

By the statements contained in this work, it is my wish to promote the clarification of the latter question. Incidentally I shall elaborate on more remote considerations.

The true cause of the war is the Eastern ambition of Russia, which is as old as her position as a great power, and which has for as long a time been hanging over us like the sword of Damocles. That ambition is founded in the

geographical situation and in great facts of ethnography and history; for that reason it has, although occasionally kept in the background, never ceased to exist in the Russian people's soul, accompanying each Muscovite success and manifesting itself in every instance of internal weakening. Strength relied on it to assert itself, and for dissatisfaction, which always travels with weakness, it acted as a drain.

It was that ambition which prompted Peter the Great, who hardly had extended his realm to the shore of the Black Sea, to conceive the idea of the overthrow of Turkey by means of exploiting racial kinship and religious ties with the southern Slavs.

Empress Catherine II., attracted by the same ideal, dreamed of seating her grandson on the throne of Constantinople, and her favorite on that of the principalities of the lower Danube, that they may rule the straits and make the Greeks rebel against the Turks. In the peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji she finds a subterfuge enabling her to demand the protectorate over the Christians of the East and to interfere with internal affairs of Turkey.

The thought of a great Empire of the East was flourishing during the reign of Alexan-

der I. as well, who had an agreement with Napoleon regarding the division of the Balkan peninsula, actually conquered the Danube principalities and cast hungry looks toward Constantinople.

It was perhaps during the reign of Nicholas I. that Muscovite ambition came nearest to its realization, when the Czar, after a victorious campaign, took the Ottoman Empire under his protection with his fleet riding at anchor and his army in camp in the neighborhood of Constantinople, exercising a recognized protectorate over the Danube principalities, dominating Servia and in full control of the straits. At the peace of San Stefano the Russians again approached the materialization of their plans. During a military occupation extending over several years, Alexander II. believes to be able definitely to make a Russian province of Great Bulgaria, his creation, which would carry Russian supremacy to the gates of Constantinople.

He also thinks of keeping mutilated Roumania, the base of his operations during the time of the occupation, under Russian influence, so that a large portion of the Balkan countries would have been brought under Russian protectorate.

And the protectorate for which the Czars

thirsted meant unconditional rule, a relation in which charges were to be turned into slaves.

Early does the powerful Czar show his selfishness! Catherine II. leaves the roused-up Greeks in the lurch; Alexander I. the Servians. The Servians, especially, are to be kept in servitude right from the beginning; for a long time the Russians oppose the succession of the Obrenovich dynasty. The same minister, Garaschanin, whom first they had turned out, they have again appointed.[1]

Ignoring the opposition of Prince Milos, they foisted a pernicious constitution on the Servian people.

Roumania, too, has on more than one occasion been made to feel the iron fist of Russia, last in the war of 1876–78. Before the war began, Gortschakov had declared that he did not intend to respect Roumania's neutrality, but would make her territory the base of his operations, against her will, if necessary. Thus Russia was about to act toward Roumania in the same manner so cordially resented by her to-day in the case of the Germans *vs.* Belgium.

During the war she makes the Roumanians feel that they are cast for a humble rôle. She

[1] Russia demanded Garaschanin's demission in 1853, and his return into power in 1867.

does not want the Roumanian army to share in the glory of the expected easy victory, and put her to the inferior task of guarding the Turkish prisoners. Only when they get into a scrape at Plevna do the Russians make up their minds to treat the Roumanian army as one ought to treat an ally. After the victory, however, gratitude is thrown to the winds and Roumania forced to cede Bessarabia to the Russians and accept the Dobrudsha in exchange, in clear violation of the ante-bellum agreement guaranteeing the integrity of Roumania. There is an outcry and protest. But the Czar is not joking, and threatens that he would simply disarm that very Roumanian army which saved him at Plevna.

An interesting light is thrown, illuminating the Russian conception, by the memorandum sent by Gortschakov to Andrássy[1] (on February 12, 1878), in which, in the voice of moral indignation, he amplifies that Roumania "whose existence itself is a violation of all protocols of diplomacy, claims, in the shadow of Russian victories, complete independence."

Let them not refer to the circumstance—con-

[1] Austria-Hungary's great Minister of foreign affairs; whenever the name of Andrássy is mentioned in this work, the author always refers to the elder Andrássy, his father. (Transl.)

tinues the Russian Chancellor—that without the guaranty of territorial integrity they would not have joined Russia, for they are fully aware that in that event Russia would have disregarded their opposition and considered Roumania Turkish territory.

It strikes one like irony that Gortschakov explains his promise relating to integrity that it was made for the event of defeat only, but could not refer to a victory won together.

The significance and character of Russian protection is likewise illuminated by Bulgaria's treatment at the hands of Alexander III.

Although the Russians had so frequently boasted that they had been fighting for the freedom of Bulgaria, yet, as soon as that country wanted to enjoy its fruits, they proved that it was never their intention to create an independent Bulgarian nation, but only had in mind to have an obedient servant near Constantinople, who would keep the Sultan in corresponding submissiveness.

They demanded of Prince Battenberg to appoint Russian ministers, and when the prince dismissed those who served not his but the Czar's interest, he lost the good-will of his high protector. Nicholas II. turns definitely against Bulgaria's ruler when the latter has the hardi-

hood to annex East Roumelia without asking the Czar's permission. In his wrath he forgets the past of his own country. Great Bulgaria was a creation of Russia in the peace of San Stefano, and when the powers intimated a partition of Great Bulgaria, extorted from Turkey, Gortschakov writes that such would amount to the execution of a nation.

Now he wants to sustain his decree of extermination, if for no other reason, then because the ruler of Bulgaria ventured to prove a will free from Russian tutelage. And it is characteristic of Russian ambition that when Battenberg announces the union, the agreement entered into between Giers and Kalnoky in 1881, and extended for three years in 1884, is still in force, which agreement guarantees that Austria-Hungary will not object to that union, so that Battenberg served such purposes that were Russia's as well. The prince's fault consisted only in not carrying out the Russian idea according to orders and Russian instructions, but independently. This was enough to make the Czar assume an opposing attitude against the reconstruction of his own work. Alexander III., the champion of the principle of legitimacy, the autocrat, whose father and predecessor became the victim of assassination, forgets himself, led

by the instinct of power, to such extent that he allows himself to shield that most dangerous and condemnable form of disloyalty, military conspiracy, by not permitting those who raised their sacrilegious hands against their war-lord and sovereign to suffer their rightful punishment.

The inexorability of Russian persecution is not brought to end by Battenberg's humility. The prince committed the error to place his position at the disposal of the Czar, whose frigid answer came back in the word, "Resign!"

This, too, had to happen, and the fall of Prince Alexander will remain an eternal example of that liberty which Russian protection grants to the people "protected" by it.

Yet the downfall of Battenberg does not signify the end of Bulgaria's sufferings.

Russia wanted to take into her own hands Bulgaria's government altogether, and to vest its power into a Russian general; she fails to recognize Coburg, the new ruler, and keeps egging on the Turk to punish the new prince who, contrary to Russia's wish, dares to give his people good government. Again the Czar does not stop short—from wanting to save conspirators and assassins.

From beginning to end the aims of Russia's ambition remained the same: domination of the Balkans. Ignatiev, the intellectual originator of the last Russo-Turkish war and influential statesman, expresses that century-long effort of Russia in his memoirs, just published, that while the Christian peoples ought to be liberated, Russia's true purpose should only be that those peoples "be political tools" and that all Slavdom "be subordinate to a common diplomatic and economic bent"—the will of the Czar.

"Only in order to accomplish that end may Russia bring sacrifices and look after their liberation and consolidation. To consider the means to be the end, or, in other words, to keep the liberation of the Slavs before one's eyes, and then permit that they enter the service of an anti-Russian policy, to be satisfied with a humane success (says an unselfish, great Slavophile), would be a course to be disapproved by us decidedly."

Such Russian ambition always held great danger for us. It was always known that wherever Russia planted her foot on the Balkans, there, owing to the religious and racial ties which give her strength, and the prestige acquired by her selfish, but for Christians, beneficial wars, her potentiality would take deeper

root than that of any other great power, and that her influence would approach our next-door neighbors of the western part of the Balkans.

It was just as certain that Russia's supremacy on the Balkans and its accompanying Slav propaganda would give the Southern Slav agitation, dangerously existing within our borders for a long time, an increased impetus, and as soon as the power of Czardom would have eaten its way into the Balkans, its corroding influence would have made itself felt within our boundaries. Russia could not stop at results achieved on the Balkan peninsula. As soon as she rules there she would have to essay to gain a foothold in our country, to mobilize the forces through which she had been working there: religious and racial community. Why, her traditions would point the way. Czar Peter already began to get in touch with the Servians colonized in Hungary, and Ignatiev clearly describes why Russia ought to lead the Slavs of our monarchy: "It would be easy for the old, centralistic Austria, which tried to preserve her former position in Germany and Italy," sincerely states this statesman in his memoirs, "to be our ally. But dualistic Austria, which aims to reach the Ægean Sea (?!) to create

an Eastern Hapsburg empire, suppressing its Slav peoples, and giving the leadership to Magyars and Poles, this Austria is our greatest rival and enemy, with whom we shall have to fight, sooner or later, a life and death battle for predominance in the near East for Russia's unity and integrity and to preserve for Russia her position acquired by orthodoxy and the labor of the most numerous and powerful Slavic race, wrought for several centuries, and vouchsafed to it by the Almighty. Austrian and Turkish Slavs should become our allies and the tools of our policy against Germandom."

The events of the present war clearly show that the Russian government has left nothing undone to make Ignatiev's wish come true, that the rolling roubles have for a long time been working in the interest of Slav brotherhood in our lands, among the Ruthenians of Galicia, as well as the Servians of Southern Hungary.

Strategically speaking, too, we would be caught in a fateful position if Russian supremacy would materialize in the east of the Balkans, keeping us constantly between two fires.

The complete embrace with which our enemies are surrounding us even at the present moment would become absolutely fatal had they better

forces at their command. Only the valor of our army and our moral superiority save us even to-day from the peril which is hurled against us by an injurious political situation overlong tolerated.

This situation became absolutely intolerable by the fact that Russian ambition took, of late, a course most dangerous for us. While, in the eighties, Russia tried to consolidate her power mainly in Bulgaria and the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula, to-day she looked for and found her "political tools," for which Ignatiev was so anxious, in the western part of the Balkans, wedged in between our borders, —in our next-door neighbor, Servia.

This gave Russian ambition an edge directed against us. While it was gravitating toward Bulgaria, the danger was only indirect and consisted mainly in the circumstance that, getting a foothold in Bulgaria, its dominating influence would presumably approach our boundaries; as soon as that ambition manifested itself in Servia it threatened us immediately. Russian supremacy in Bulgaria was directed against Turkey, and perhaps England, with the ultimate aim to bring the straits under its unconditional dominion; a Russian protectorate taking root in Servia, on the other hand, endangered, as

a matter of course, in the first place, our integrity.

Russian politics were fully aware, too, of this great difference. Russian politics knew that the extension of their influence over Servia and Bosnia-Herzegovina must lead to a clash, and often hoped that by letting us have those parts, it would, by way of amicable arrangement with us, be able to acquire the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula.

Division of the sphere of power, parallel action and parallel conquest are ideas as old as the Eastern question; they were, however, always accompanied by the afterthought that the overthrow of Turkey having once been accomplished by partition, Russian influence would, by the use of the formidable means at its command, soon dispose of our influence.

Such an offer to divide was made by Panin to Kaunitz at the time of the first partition of Poland. Catherine II., the subtle female diplomatist, endeavored to win over Joseph II., the great dreamer. In the time of Napoleon I., Czar Alexander also had plans of partition by which Servia would have fallen to our share. Just prior to the Crimean war Russia invited us to march into Servia and Bosnia, while she would invest the Danube countries.

During the last Russo-Turkish war it was likewise one of the fundamental plans of Russia to divide the spheres of power in the Balkans in such manner that in Servia and west of it our influence should rule, and hers extend eastward. This thought led Gortschakov to agree with Julius Andrássy in 1875, at Reichstadt, that in the event of the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire Austria-Hungary should receive Bosnia, the object of Servia's ancient coveting, laying, in a manner characteristic of the "protector," stress on the importance of keeping the agreement secret, especially from Servia and Montenegro.

In 1876, when Servia, mainly in consequence of Russian agitation, was already at war with Turkey, the Czar, in an autograph letter, offers us his alliance, with the advice to march into Bosnia, when the Russians would enter Bulgaria.

The negotiations started by the above-mentioned letter resulted, in fact, in the agreement by which Russia renounced her activity in the western Balkans, acquiesced in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and agreed not to touch Servia with her army; we promised neutrality and that also otherwise we would not restrict Russia's war operations. At the end

of the war, before the peace of San Stefano, the Russian government again offers us Bosnia and Herzegovina, notwithstanding the fact that Servia had been actively helping in the war, and inviting us to remain there definitely, even after Russia's host evacuates Bulgaria. After the peace of San Stefano the Czar proved his loyalty to our military attaché, Berchtoldheim, by leaving our sphere of power on the western Balkans untouched. (February 25, 1878.)

Bismarck was also of the opinion that we may become reconciled to Russia's exercising her supremacy in Bulgaria, if ours is assured in Servia; he even interpreted the Berlin agreement in such manner that he intended to thus divide the sphere of power on the Balkans that the western portion remain under the influence of Austria-Hungary, and the eastern under that of Russia. And it is such a stable idea of Russian politics to try to gain a free hand in the eastern part of the Balkans by sacrificing the great Servian hopes, that in 1881 and 1884 Giers again made an agreement with Kalnoky, in which he joins in the annexation and in consideration thereof gains certain freedom of action in the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula.

The same basic thought became effective when

Isvolsky in Buchlau accepted the final annexation of the provinces occupied by us, and Aehrenthal promised that he would not object to a revision of the Dardanelles question.

Those plannings, those partition offers, were all made in the knowledge that anything touching the northwestern part of the Balkans was regarded by us as forbidden ground, which Russia could not touch without provoking us, that peace with us would be impossible as soon as Russia would extend her sphere of power to our next-door neighbor, Servia, and that Russia could easier afford to give up her influence in Servia and the western part of the Balkans than its eastern part and that influence which she intends to exercise along the coast of the Black Sea which is of such momentous import with regard to her politico-economic development.

Therefore, as soon as Russia took Servia under her most particular patronage and based her Eastern policies upon her alliance with Servia, it became evident that she had made up her mind to risk a clash with us.

And Russia's tendency to attack was made the more unmistakable by the fact that Servia, just during the Russian protection, began to show us her ever-growing hostility, which did

not decrease Russia's friendship for her, so that Russia's cordial relations with her became a conscious and constant sign of defiance. War became inevitable when Pasics continued his Great-Servian traffickings, loudly proclaiming Russia's friendship and protection.

I am not going to deny that we have committed errors in our relations with Servia, but there exists no doubt, that we, the larger state, did not wish to make conquest at the expense of Servia, but that the smaller state wanted to expand at our expense.

The first big collision between ourselves and the Servians happened at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not on account of the annexation; that only sharpened the contrasts existing. We should rather say that the annexation was a direct consequence of the Servian movement and of that settled conviction of our leading circles, caused thereby, that the growing Servian propaganda could not be stifled as long as our public legal status would not be adjusted definitely, internationally. The then Bosnian government stated that the southern Slavic agitation is facilitated by the noising about of the rumor that Bosnia and Herzegovina had only temporarily been intrusted to our government and that the Euro-

pean mandate would soon expire, as its purpose had become objectless.

Annexation intended to counteract those rumors and agitations.

Yet for that very reason it created increased exasperation. After the annexation, the Servian nation, official and non-official, assumed such a provoking attitude which is perhaps unique in the history of people living at peace with each other. The Servian minister of foreign affairs of that day, who, by the way, was one of the most moderate politicians, stated as follows: "I declare without hesitancy, here, as the minister responsible for the foreign policies of Servia, that in the situation created in these days the Servian national programme demands the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

True, the minister was graciously inclined to be satisfied, for the time being, with a transitory solution, but its significance and the aim of the transitoriness is clearly expressed in the following statement:

"As far as the rivers Save and Danube, although many millions of Servians live beyond them, Austria may remain our friend. On the right bank of the Save, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria spells eternal danger and constant menace for us. By taking possession of

Bosnia and Herzegovina and hindering our access to the Adriatic, by wedging in between us and Montenegro, intercepting the direct communication between the two countries, Austria-Hungary is driving us and the entire Servian race toward a gigantic life and death struggle to be fought in the near future or perhaps a little later."

After several other party leaders and prominent men had made statements of similar import and declared that Austria-Hungary could only be considered a friendly nation if it would cease to be a great power and would restrict herself to the rôle of a Switzerland of the East; that, furthermore, for the defense of national ideals the Balkan federation ought to be formed, that the nation should arm and prepare for the heroic struggle which is inevitable—the Skuptshina (legislative body), on the motion of Pasics, passed this resolution: "Having listened to and taken cognizance of the foreign minister's speech, in which he promised that the royal government would do everything in its power to bring forth, at the time of the revision of the Berlin convention, the assurance of the political and economic independence of Servia and Montenegro, the diet, on its part, declares that, according to its conviction, that purpose can

only be achieved if Bosnia and Herzegovina will assume the international position of being a vassal duchy under the suzerainty of his Majesty the Sultan of Turkey under a guarantee of the great powers, and if a connection between Servia and Montenegro is accomplished through Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the assurance that Servia be at liberty freely to export her merchandise over all railways in every direction to any other country." [1]

The Servian attack was broken on Baron Aehrenthal's tenacious energy. Europe recognized the annexation and Servia withdrew her protest, promising not to do anything against and to live on good neighborly terms with us.

For a time she kept her promise, but not long. In the manner forecast by her, she kept on arming herself, organized the Balkan federation, partly directed against our Monarchy, attacked Turkey, eventually vanquished Bulgaria, but did not forget us. Her claims, raised during the Turkish campaign, again brought her into collision with our Monarchy, which, together with the Chauvinism strengthened by two victorious wars, gave new nourishment to the old hate. The Bosnian question was again put on the calendar, and Servia, with renewed energy,

[1] "The Servian Question," by Georgevich, ex-Premier of Servia.

again started her nefarious digging, which led to the horrible deed of Sarajevo.

During all that time Belgrade was the scene of the constant vituperation of our Monarchy and its ruler, and the nest of conspiracies branching out far and wide. Several societies, the Omladina, Narodna, Slovenski Jug, Sokol, etc., persistently agitate for revolution. Our own Servian youth is taken to Belgrade for "educational purposes" and taken around the country half-price, pumped full of hatred against the Hapsburg dynasty, the Monarchy, the German and Hungarian nations. Military officers make speeches to them about the holy war. In the press and privately the teaching is spread that Austrian and Hungarian society must be terrorized by attempts on the lives of public men, and that revolution must be brought about; secretly and openly it is announced that the Servian nation must remain weak as long as it is divided and that it can only be united in the emblem of liberty by blood and fire.

For many years countless cases of police interference, punishment, lèse majesté trials became necessary to suppress the movement in Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in our Hungarian counties with a partly Servian

population, but all those expedients did not accomplish anything as long as the revolutionaries found support next door.

Many attempts at assassination were made, with more or less success. Among them we mention only those against Administrator Cuvaj, Banus of Croatia Skerlecz, Army Corps Commander Varesanin. The assailants all loudly claimed that their object was the liberation of the southern Slavs. The assassination of the Crown Prince was only the natural consequence of that chain of misdeeds. And to the latter, Servian society and the state organs of the Kingdom of Servia gave their aid, their co-operation. Officers of high military rank, high-school teachers, treasury officials, and members of the border police help to stage the nauseous crime; one of its perpetrators alleges to have had parley with one of the princes of the blood. Weapons were supplied from the royal arsenal. Cabrinovics, one of the assailants, ruefully declares at the trial that not he, but Servia, Servian society, wanted the murder done. He thought of doing something great and gaining glory when he saw how they celebrated the deed. And after the murder the Servian government does not deem it necessary immediately to step in for the prevention of

similar crimes and the arrest of would-be assassins. Neither does it order the suspension of the societies, whose agitatory activity was known to everybody in Servia and in our country, but calmly waits for our ultimatum, even then advancing her plea of sovereignty, under the shadow of which so many criminal attempts had been perpetrated.

Such was the agitation which the Russian giant took under his protection in the name of Slavic feeling. Hartwig, the Russian minister, who was the soul of the south Slav movement, was in a position to see much, know more, and stand for everything.

And when the revolutionary propaganda shed royal blood, Russia still stood by Servia. Although we declared that it was not our intention to make conquests to the detriment of Servia, Sasonov at once emphasized that he could not permit Servia to be defeated and that he could not desert his charge. In one word, the Czar's government, its protestations notwithstanding, actually assumed a position of solidarity with the Great-Servian machinations, and in the very place where its mere influence meant great danger for us, permitted, nay, protected such an aggressive, offensive policy which, even without its powerful protection,

imperiled the inner solidity of our Monarchy.

Under Russian protection Servia stirred up one of those questions which can be solved by blood alone, when she loudly proclaimed and declared that her existence could not be safe without the conquest of territories belonging to Austria-Hungary, and when she permitted that her society incite to rebellion within our borders.

This situation had become intolerable, and it was not only our right but our duty as well to settle scores, to break through the hostile ring which had placed itself around us and was ready to choke us at the first opportune moment.

In the face of this the accusation brought against us that we should have caused the war by exaggerated demands violating Servia's sovereignty which King Peter could not accept, collapses and loses all significance.

This is not the first case where one state interferes with governmental matters of the other. It seems that the Russian government has become oblivious of the fact that on more than one occasion it has claimed for itself much furthergoing rights from the Porte, sometimes alone, sometimes in conjunction with other powers, than we were now wishful to exercise in Servia, and that with less cause and justice

than we. While Russia, more than once, demanded permanent rights from Turkey in the interest of Turkish subjects, without having had cause to do so on account of any act of provocation on the part of Turkey, we desired to exercise certain rights in Servia only temporarily for the sake of our own security and only for the purpose of instituting certain preliminary investigations after a most audacious attack.

Perhaps they forgot in Belgrade that a few years ago they demanded of the Porte that a foreign rural police be organized in Macedonia, and that the Servian minister exercise a controlling influence over the Turkish government.

If that demand did not offend Turkish sovereignty, then the co-operation of our organs, as urged in our note, was compatible with Servian sovereignty.

True, our demands were out of the ordinary, the usual, but, let me ask, was the situation which made our self-assertion unavoidable, a usual one? Could any state be expected to tolerate such conspiracies as the Servian government permitted itself to foster, to overlook such attempts as Servian society openly and noisily staged at our borders with the connivance of official persons? If it was meddling

with Servian affairs what we demanded, was it less that same thing which Servia permitted and did for years?

The statement that we are after conquest should also be relegated into the realm of fiction.

The imposition that we want Saloniki bears an ancient date. It was rumored of Julius Andrássy that his reason for laying so much stress on acquiring the Sandchak was that from there he intended to advance to the Ægean Sea. But that is not true. The idea of conquest never entered his mind. His desire was to spread our influence in the Balkans by active politics and more extensive working of economic possibilities, but territorial conquest he never coveted. On the contrary, he had grave misgivings with regard to long and disadvantageous strategic border lines. He feared that the peoples of the Balkans would become our enemies if they saw that we want to take territory; but he was confident that, abstaining from conquest, taking a firm stand against Russian domination, pursuing a policy of self-respect, which makes intriguing against us injurious and friendship with us useful, we would draw strength from the Balkans. He did lay stress on the acquisition of the Sandchak, so that

Servia might not unite with Montenegro, in order that we may not be surrounded by a great South-Slavic state which, as a matter of course, would covet Bosnia and Herzegovina, lying between, and that such a possible Slav state should not cut us off from the formations that might arrive in the southern portion of the Balkans, and finally that we may remain next neighbors to Albania as well as to the country commanding Saloniki.

Andrássy's successors thought of conquest even less than he. Their Eastern policy was, generally speaking, less active than Andrássy would have liked to see it; none of them thought of new acquisition, but the slander persisted. Among the successors of Andrássy, Baron Aehrenthal, who pursued the most energetic Eastern policy, and of whom one could have most reasonably believed that he was bent on conquest, proved by facts that he had no thought of Saloniki. By voluntarily waiving all claims to the Sandchak he most effectively refuted the legend of the conquest. But even that did not help; the spreading of the rumors continued. Not once, during the last war, did we attempt to acquire as much as a village south of the Herzegovina frontier in the general turmoil, and calmly looked on when the Sandchak

which we had turned over to Turkey was divided between Servia and Montenegro, thereby losing the immediate contact with the other factors of the Balkans, which had existed as long as the Turks ruled in Novi-Bazar, and ceased as soon as it became Servian, but still they maintain that we are yearning for Saloniki. I think it quite probable that if, after a victorious termination of the present war, we are again going to prove that we have no aspiration to get to the Ægean Sea, the fairy tale of our thirst for conquest will still be believed. For our enemies need it. Servia does not want the story for her own sake. She finds the justification of her own attitude in her national ambition. Among the great powers and the rest of the Balkan states the belief in our desire of making conquests must be maintained. Even in Russia the belief in our aggressiveness must survive to keep up the proper public mood. The pacific elements of Russian society can be prepossessed against us only if they believe that they are confronted with our dangerous and illegitimate ambition of expansion. That is the reason why the press of the Entente spread the Saloniki tale, and that is why they are going to keep it up. Not because they believe it, but because they want to have others

believe it. And the story will live forever; not because they will forever believe it, but because it will forever be necessary that others should.

To defend their attacks upon us they are also in the habit of saying that at the time of the annexation we manifested a dangerously offensive spirit. It is surprising that serious men are able to make such a statement without blushing. There are and may be differences of opinion as regards the expediency of the annexation, and it may form a subject for discussion whether Isvolsky did have any cause of complaint against Aehrenthal; the formal legality of our procedure is also debatable; but to assert that we showed dangerous aggressiveness is absurd.

By the annexation we did not gain a penny, did not add an inch of territory, did not increase our war power by a single man. We acquired a new legal title for a power exercised for a long time. Does this threaten the equilibrium of Europe? Is this a dangerous offensive? Is it an act calling for retaliation? The French obtained Morocco, the English subjugated the free Boer people, the Russians are constantly expanding, all of this is not dangerous, all of this does not threaten the balance of power; but, on the other hand, it is

an insupportable encroachment if we for our good money purchase empty external appearances.

As far as Austria-Hungary is concerned it is my conclusion that she could not have avoided the war. When, even after the Sarajevo murder, our government made another peaceful overture, it gave almost exaggerated proof of its love of peace.

But now I want to take up the attitude of Germany.

CHAPTER II

GERMANY AND TURKEY

I DO not wish to speak of the agreement which binds the German Empire to us and of the duties accompanying it; I only wish to pass criticism regarding our neighbor's action from the viewpoint of those great interests which are more important than contracts, for they cause the making of agreements and are liable to destroy them.

It suffices, no doubt, that the offensive directed against us, meaning the Russian, does not immediately concern the German Empire and that the materialization of the south Slav idea would not have affected German territory; but, indirectly, Slav expansion would have endangered the existence of Germany. A Slav victory over Austria-Hungary would have been

fatal for the Germanic race, and the breaking down of Austria-Hungary would have isolated Germany.

The danger of a Teutonic-Slavic contest has always existed since 1870.

It was not absolutely sure to take place, for neither Germany nor Russia have interests vital enough which would call for the vanquishing of the other, but still it became inevitable as soon as Russia counted on a sure victory over us, which would have happened had she beaten or slavicized us.

An attack upon Germany could not have been avoided after the realization of the south Slav ideal, for the formation of the German Empire and the broad development of German strength since 1870 constitutes an obstacle to Russian supremacy, for the south Slavic union would have unconditionally been followed by Moscow's attempt to gain supremacy in the name of the Greek cross. The old situation, a Germany divided into a federation of German kingdoms and tiny principalities, was more favorable for the Czar than the present one. On more than one historic occasion was he made the Lord of Europe owing to Germandom's weakness; that fact had facilitated Catherine's conquests and furnished Alexander I. and Nich-

olas I. decisive influence over the deliberations of European cabinets.

Rightly conceived, her interests did not force Russia to risk the overthrowing of the Germanic world, but it is beyond any doubt that the loftiest flights of Muscovite ambition led toward Vienna and Berlin, to the overlordship of the Slav races and a domination of Europe, and that as soon as one of the neighboring central European states would have been conquered, the next one would have to follow. Muscovite lust of conquest and instinct to spread, which since Czar Ivan the Terrible to this day has been one of the mainsprings of national life and led to enormous expansion, could not stop halfways.

Generally speaking, the spirit which espoused Servian aggression, which shelters cruel shedders of royal blood, is the feeling of Slav solidarity and unity which in the "Peace Czar" overcame the principle of monarchic solidarity and the love of peace; it had to come to a clash with the German spirit and with every independent force existing near to it.

Bismarck showed great—in my opinion too great—indifference as far as Eastern interests were concerned. His word, that the Balkan is

"Hecuba"[1] to him and not worth the bones of a single Prussian grenadier, is historic. I believe Germany's present Eastern policy to be sounder than that of the Iron Chancellor, but Bismarck himself would not have tolerated Russia's present aggressiveness, for the question now is not who should rule in Bulgaria and over the Dardanelles, not even whose influence be authoritative in Belgrade, next door to us; it is not, in other words, a question of prestige, but to smother the experiments made against our territorial integrity; therein Bismarck had always supported us, even before the signing of the alliance, because he knew that Germany, too, needed Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. He was guided by that conviction when, in the peace of Nicolsburg in 1866, he claimed no Austrian territory.

That conviction he also expressed in 1887, during the debate in which he pointed to the fact that the Eastern interests of Germany are not worth a war, in the following manner: "Our relations to Austria are based upon the consciousness of each of us that the existence of one as a full great power is a necessity for the other."

[1] What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba that he should weep for her?—HAMLET, II. 2.

Neither could Germany afford to exercise pressure over us to secure our pliability. Such pressure would have swept the Monarchy with the Slav current, and the latter (Austria-Hungary) would have felt forsaken at a moment when she would have been called upon to defend herself. If Germany had not supported her at the time of Slavic attack, but would have forced her to bargain and retreat, if the ally had tried to weaken that mood which, in us, called for steadfastly holding our ground against continuous and increasing south Slav propaganda, our Monarchy would have been compelled to change the essence of her policy.

No one had a right to demand of us that we keep on preparing and arming ourselves, to spend our money for the maintenance of our position as a great power, and then to withdraw like cowards when we were slapped in the face.

The universal enthusiasm which greeted our energetic attitude (mentioned also in the report of the Russian ambassador in Vienna) was the voice of the instinct of self-preservation, which gave a shout of joy on perceiving that at last, anyway, we would defend ourselves against that underground activity which was caused by our disparagement and would have had fatal conse-

quences. Had our ally repressed that attitude and that mood, irreparable damage would have ensued.

Our enemies want to saddle the odium of the war on Germany and charge that she caused it by her ultimatum.

The fact is true, but the argument is erroneous.

Germany sent her ultimatum only when she saw that the Czar had already mobilized against her as well, although he knew that such meant his being called to task, and when longer waiting would have given Russia dangerous advantage, when Germany had the performance of only one duty left to her, to promote her victory, and when she could no longer subordinate the advantage of quick mobilization to the empty appearances of peace discussions.

The German ultimatum was no political offensive; its only purpose was to introduce the strategic offensive, to prevent the enemy from gaining time by parleys, anyway hopeless, to make ready his army, whereby Germany would have lost the advantage involved in quick mobilization.

And in the tense moments before the war, those, too, who to-day call it aggressiveness, found Germany's course perfectly natural. The

British ambassador, on July 25th, warned Sasonov "that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once."

Anyway, history shows by more than one example that it was not always the country which wanted or caused a war that declared war, sent the ultimatum or began hostilities.

Thus there exists no doubt whatever that it was Kaunitz who wanted what is known as the Seven Years' War, for it was he who plotted with France and Russia to attack Frederick II.; still, the war was begun by the King of Prussia, who quickly saw that only by rushing the offensive could he save himself from being overwhelmed.

Again, it is a generally admitted fact that in 1859 it was Cavour who was seeking war with Austria for the liberation of Italy, who conspired with Napoleon III. against the Hapsburg Monarchy, one of the articles of which conspiracy was that he would goad Austria into making an attack. It is well known that Cavour's plan proved to be successful and that Austria, when she sent her ultimatum to Victor Emmanuel and opened hostilities did only

what Cavour wanted her to do and what she herself had tried to avoid.

In the circles of the Entente the incentive for its anti-German policy was stated to be militarism. Prussian militarism. They make Prussia responsible for the militarism which has entailed such sacrifices upon Europe's peoples.

Still, this statement, too, is contradicted by facts. True, in no other country does the army play a more important rôle in internal politics than in Prussia, but why should that concern other countries? Every state arranges its internal affairs as it best suits it, and it surely would amount to a relapse into a barbarous past if we should wage war with each other to shape the ways and sentiments of our neighbors to conform with our own taste.

Whoever does not like the prominent part the army plays in Prussia should not imitate those ways, but maintain the rule of the civilian class in his own state.

There are many who do not like the anti-religious tendency and the socialistic republic of the France of to-day, but would it occur to any other state to attack France just to drive her into more sympathetic political ways?

At any rate, the anti-German coalition is not concerned in German militarism.

It is only brought forward to influence public opinion. When the Czar, the French socialists, and Lloyd-George walk the same narrow path it is hard to keep up the ridiculous fiction to bring the war home to internal political tendencies. Who, I'm asking, has the hardihood to tell me that Czarism wishes to assure citizens rule over militarism?

Neither does the argument set forth on behalf of the above question hold ground, namely, that Germany must be overthrown because the rivalry of armament, oppressing the economic life of the whole world, was caused by Germany.

It was not Germany which started that competition and it is not Germany that leads in it, even to-day. The great fever of preparation and equipment started in France in 1886. It was induced by that new phase of her political life which began when Jules Ferry fell through with his colonial policy and French public opinion demanded of its government not to permit the desire for distant adventures to relegate the thought of "Revanche" into the background, but to give their whole attention to continental politics. It was at that time that the slogan, "Strengthen the Army," was given out to secure France's balance on the scales of Europe.

General Boulanger exploited that mood for

his chauvinistic propaganda and for development of the French army in large proportions which to-day is to be attributed to the Germans. This is an indubitable fact which is not denied even by our enemies. Thus the historic faculty of Oxford University, in its pamphlet published against the Germans, acknowledges that the rivalry of preparation was started by the French, but notwithstanding and in a marvelous manner it wants to throw the odium for it at Germany.

In his interesting historic work ("L'Allemagne et la France") the Frenchman Albin points to the fact that the rivalry was instigated by the internal political development of France, which turned away from colonial enterprises as she was wishful to reacquire her European reputation, the condition *sine qua non* of which was the strengthening of the army.

Neither did the last great effort start from Berlin, but from Paris and St. Petersburg. The feverish preparations of the Russians after their Japanese war and the introduction of the three-year service in France made Germany's last gigantic effort necessary.

But it does not correspond with the facts, either, that Germany leads in matters of armament. The proportionate effort of France is

much greater than hers, for with 40,000,000 inhabitants the new law of national defense wanted to raise the war strength of her army from 4,500,000 to 4,750,000 and the peace strength to 900,000, while Germany, with 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 people, only wanted to raise the war strength of her army to 4,000,000, and to 800,000 in time of peace.[1] And is it not barefaced of England to accuse Germany of overpreparation when she spends much more money for war purposes than Germany, and when she loudly proclaims the principle that her navy must at all times be bigger than that of the two countries possessing the largest navies between them?

Therefore, the Germans have not caused the war of to-day. They could not have acted differently. Besides German faithfulness, the interest of the German Empire demanded its standing up alongside of us in these hours of sore trial and take its share in a war which is of an absolutely defensive character.

There exist such who said, let us attack the powers of the Entente, let us look for a cause and occasion for war, for they are not quite prepared, and if we should not attack them

[1] "Armies and Navies of all Nations of the World," 1914, Captain Rottmann.

they will fall upon us when they shall have developed their gigantic war strength. I also heard it advocated that the triple alliance ought to bring about war because the colonies are occupied by the Entente, and soon we should be unable to develop economically within the confines of our comparatively narrow boundaries.

I acknowledge that many arguments might be presented for both of these viewpoints, but the present war—let us thank God—is not the consequence of such considerations and prophecies. For such reasons I, in the capacity of a leader, should never have dared to engage in a war. Still I would rather assume the responsibility for the present war than that for the politics which permitted matters to come to such a point, where from the aggressiveness of Servia a world war should ensue, and for the activity by which diplomacy paved the way for it.

Many mistakes had to be made before the political situation could be brought to such extremes, the impudence of Servia increased to such proportions, her sentimental ties with Russia so strengthened, and the whole world divided into two camps, as actually happened; but we surely should have committed an error,

graver than the preceding ones, had we continued to submit to that humiliation and the loss growing day by day which would have followed in the wake of our continued forbearance.

There are situations in political life that can be likened only to the encircling of Sedan, which demoralizes and vanquishes the surrounded foe before the first shot is fired.

Such would have been our fate if, after the continued vexation of years, after the expenditure of many millions for preparation, caused by Servia, we should have continued to submit to the invidious attacks of Russian-protected Servia, and such would have been the fate of the Hohenzollern dynasty had she forsaken us.

Now, in the moments of war's horrors; now, when bloody strife has already so deeply wounded humanity; now, when the murderous contest is still undecided, and we know not whom God's judgment will permit to prevail; even now I say it, even now I repeat it: We could not avoid the great accounting, and it was not merely our right, but our duty of self-sacrifice demanded our energetic and quick action, without the loss of a moment.

Had we waited longer, our self-esteem, our self-trust would have been torn to shreds, and so would our power of resistance, our

inner unity, our integrity. If Germany had failed to support us to-day, she would have fallen to-morrow under the ax-strokes of that coalition, the edge of which is, anyway, not directed against us, but mainly against her, the true motive power of which is that it did not suit the older great powers that Germany, the weak group of states, had become a great power, that Germany which used to sell soldiers to England for good money, at the expense of which France could make conquests with impunity, and the divided state of which made Russia master of Europe on more than one occasion; Germany, of which it was not taken ill to have produced Goethe and Schiller, which, however, ought not to have brought forth Bismarck and Moltke, because they make the Napoleons and the kind of czars like Nicholas I. impossible.

I can state the motives of Turkish action without much difficulty, comparatively.

It seems that the Russians attacked the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea unexpectedly, without the formality of a declaration of war.

The closing of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and the preparatory activity of Turkey alarmed Russia, and therefore she intended to destroy the fleet with one stroke. After that

assault the Turkish war is a war of self-defense in the strictest sense of the word, a justification of which is unnecessary, because self-understood.

But the arming of Turkey and her closing of the straits was also justified, and even her interference without any compulsion, for her vital interests are at stake. Only he, whose standpoint is that nations must not fight, even to defend their vital interests, can condemn the interference of Turkey; but, then, he ought to condemn the Entente still more.

Russian victory would have sealed the fate of Turkey and made it indubitable that the czars would, within the shortest time possible, have added Constantinople and Gallipoli to their dominions. Russian interest and a tradition of almost two hundred years remove any possible doubt. After a Russian victory, Turkey would have been turned over to the pleasure of the Czar, and innumerable battlefields, countless bloody wars bear witness what the Czar's pleasure means for the Turk.

The Anglo-Russian understanding made it a question of time when the partition of the Ottoman Empire ought to take place. The rivalry of those two powerful neighbors of Turkey has never ceased in the East and will never come

to a full stop. As long as they had been enemies, neither would have allowed the other to gain his end and make conquests at the expense of Turkey, which situation became one of the guaranties of the preservation of Turkey. As soon as, however, those two expansive countries agreed with another, mutual jealousy will sooner or later, but as a matter of necessity, lead to the partition of Turkey, for either has become compelled to suffer, for the sake of the alliance, the expansion of the other, and to endeavor to counteract it by his own conquests.

What would have happened is that the story of Poland would have been acted over again, which, kept alive by the hostilities of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, was choked as soon as they became friends.

Facing the danger by which the Anglo-Russian Entente threatened her, Turkey had only Germany and Austria-Hungary from where to expect help, and therefore she could not endure their defeat. On the battlefields of Galicia and Flanders the fate of the Turks was cast, and therefore it is plain and equitable that they wished to participate in those struggles.

CHAPTER III

SERVIA

THE fact of our righteousness becomes very plain if we consider that our enemies possessed no motive which would have made war unavoidable or would have justified it on their side. It sometimes happens that similarly founded, equally vital interests of nations clash and make a contest inevitable, but nothing like that has brought about the present situation.

At the time of the annexation whole legends were fabricated in Belgrade of the pretended rights of Servia. Public opinion was to be impressed by the statement that the change of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from one of occupation and administration into that of annexation, amounted to an affront to Servia and a violation of her special rights.

The then Servian minister of foreign affairs, Milanovic, declared that annexation had annulled that slight guaranty which the Berlin Conference had vouchsafed to the Servians and corked up the small ventage left open for Servian hopes, but he forgets that such could not have been the truth, for, while the Berlin Conference had intended to grant the Servians additional territory, and actually, under Austro-Hungarian influence, did give them more than was accorded to them by their Russian ally after the peace of San Stefano, there was not the most remote intention to admit their rights with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina or to encourage other Servian hopes.

Annexation, as originally planned, was not transmuted into occupation and administration for the reason that Europe wanted it done that way, or because somebody wanted to please Servia. All the great powers of Europe had been acquiescing in annexation; Servia's latter-day protector, Russia, has, to my knowledge, between 1876 and 1908, offered us those provinces, the apple of Servia's eye, on seven separate occasions, without any condition or restriction. Neither did any other power protest against the formality of annexation. The only reason why we were then satisfied with mere

occupation was that Andrássy had insisted that the policy, one of whose principal aims it was to secure the vitality of Turkey, should not lead us to a war with that country, as long as the Sultan could not definitely and formally renounce something which was still in his actual possession. Such was the sole reason why the mandate of Berlin did not spell annexation, but only occupation and administration—not any regard whatever for Servian claims. Moreover, the direct purpose of our entry and occupation of those provinces was to dispel all hopes of the Servians to spread in the direction of the Adriatic. Milanovic also stated that our Berlin mandate had expired, and besides its original purpose had only been to make us defend the former Turkish possessions against Russian expansion until the Balkan countries would be strong enough, while to-day the liberated nations could do that themselves. This explanation is not based on facts, either. The occupation was not directed against Russian expansion.

First of all, the statement that Europe had tied any "string" to the mandate intrusted to us lacks all foundation; neither was it fixed therein when and under what conditions its operation should cease. We are unable to find

any such restriction among the acts of the Berlin Conference.

The Bosnian agreement is a unanimous resolution which remains in force as long as it is not changed in a unanimous manner, which, therefore, could not have been annulled without Austria-Hungary's participation.

This was clear from the start. Immediately after the Berlin agreement, on December 1, 1878, Andrássy, in the Austro-Hungarian Delegation,[1] answered Dr. Giskra's interpellation, as to when occupation was to terminate, in this manner: Not until it will have achieved its ends, which means, until the south Slav danger will have passed; not until such time when orderly, consolidated conditions will have been inaugurated in the western portion of the Balkans, such as would continue to prevail even should we decide to withdraw from there; not until the Eastern question would cease to exist, which means never, or, at least, not under the conditions actually presenting themselves at the time of annexation.

It would be absurd to even assume that we should spend millions on a province which we only hold subject to a notice to quit.

[1] So are called the periodical joint deliberations of delegates of the parliaments of both halves of the Monarchy. (Transl.)

But neither is it a fact that the purpose of the occupation should have been to prevent Russian expansion in the western Balkans.

So many hundred miles from Russia, it was not necessary to erect bastions against her.

In Berlin the Russian representatives themselves voted in favor of the occupation. Would they have done so if it had been admittedly directed against them? But there is no need of guesswork, for Salisbury and Beaconsfield argued in favor of the proposed mandate in very clear language. Salisbury, the English plenipotentiary, brought out, under suggestions from Andrássy's written memoranda, that if a considerable portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina would come under the rule of one of the adjoining principalities, then a chain of Slav states would grow up across the Balkan peninsula the military power of which would become a menace to other races inhabiting the southern portion of the peninsula. Beaconsfield, moreover, sounded the warning that, "if the Congress should let the provinces in question remain as they exist now, the dominion of the Slavic race would come to the foreground, which means the rule of a race which has very scant inclination to show justice to others." It was south Slav revolutionary activity against

which Europe tried to defend Austria-Hungary's interest, against that activity which, according to recent Servian conception, Europe is supposed to have wished to keep alive.

South Slav activity is dangerous even to-day. It is still a fact that the consolidation of the southern Slav race into an independent state could not be brought about without the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, for such a south Slav formation would not be satisfied with the conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but would, according to natural laws, expand toward Dalmatia, Istria, Croatia, and Slavonia, and the attraction of the sea would manifest itself with irresistible force as soon as that new South Slavia would be separated from the sea only by a long narrow strip of country likewise inhabited by Slavs. South Slav ambition would not be satisfied by the conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina; they would make most of their victory, and the entire south Slav group would become united.

It can also be observed that the south Slav propaganda does not even to-day stop short at the banks of the Save, but works with equal assiduity wherever south Slavs may be found, from Laibach to the Drina and from Szegedin to Mostar.

The danger resulting from a south Slav offensive would not have been prevented by an autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because such condition would have been unable to survive, and it is impossible to imagine that the struggle of the Greek-Orthodox element with the Turks and the agricultural question should not, within a very short time, have been followed by Servian intervention, and that in such event the two neighbors should not unite, as was done by Bulgaria and East Roumelia, which, by the Berlin agreement, were supposed to remain separate.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's population offers such contrasts that only an impartial, highly civilized government of superior strength could maintain law and peace there. Orthodox, Catholic, and Mussulman elements are inhabiting the provinces in such proportions that neither could rule if attacked by one of the other two factions. Their living together peacefully under the rule of an independent prince would have been a still more difficult matter than the government of Albania proved to be, with which Prince Wied was unable to cope, for in the entire East three factions are nowhere in greater contrast with each other than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, under the

influence of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and the adjoining Servia and Montenegro, factional contrasts are always kept alive, and where the counterbalancing effect of national solidarity is also weaker than in Albania. The Bosnian or Herzegovinian feeling of belonging together is much weaker than the Albanian, for they are not a solid people racially different from their neighbors, as in the latter case.

Ostensibly the Servians expected the assurance of pacific development of those provinces from the effect of south Slav brotherhood. But the legend of the south Slav brotherhood's peace vocation is exploded by the heroic fighting of Bosnian Mussulmans and Croatian Catholics against the troops of the Serb Kingdom.

Formally the rights of Servia were not violated by a one-sided announcement of the annexation, for the occupation was decreed by Europe, and any change from that status could have been effected only by Europe or by Turkey, but not by Servia, which had no voice in the Berlin deliberations and which then definitely and completely resigned herself to our rule, exchanging her alliance with and leaning on Russia, for our friendship immediately after the Berlin Conference.

During the annexation crisis, a few years ago, Servia again acknowledged our rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that her present aggression is an inconsistent attack against a situation which she herself had twice acknowledged and to which Europe had twice, in different form, but essentially the same manner, given us right and title.

Neither does racial community give Servia any title to Bosnia and Herzegovina, for if European public opinion would adopt the point of view that by historic rights alone the desires of peoples aiming at confederation are fully justified, then peace would be constantly threatened, as new partitions would have to be effected at the expense of existing governments, which in turn would also lack the element of finality, for they would collide with geographic equity and historic connections.

It is true that if one looks at Servia's exertions from the point of view of power alone it can be explained much easier. It is beyond doubt that Servia would gain by the acquisition of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia to a considerable extent, but it is just as undeniably true that she would assume great difficulties and would have to solve great prob-

lems before being able to introduce in her realm the conditions of a peaceful commonwealth.

Her immeasurable greed has induced Servia to gobble up numerous Bulgarian elements, the assimilation of which would cost much time and be difficult under any condition, besides providing her with a new enemy; she has also subjugated certain Albanian tribes; now, if we add thereto the Mohammedan and Catholic elements to be found in the Austro-Hungarian provinces, and if we further consider that her new acquisitions can only become truly hers after the Hungarian race will have perished, after the Germans and probably the Italians, who would not look with indifference at the Slavification of the Italian colonies along the Adriatic coast, will have weakened to such extent that they would have to be content to merely look on, after the place of Austria, which is without national characteristics, will have been filled by Servia, slavicizing everything with an iron fist—then I believe it is safe for me to state that the Servian dream roots in ambition and crude overestimate of self, rather than in real calculation and serious weighing of interests. And for that to envelop the whole world in a sheet of flame cannot be

right. Servia could have avoided the clash so much easier, as we never opposed the southward expansion of a peaceful Servia and her enjoyment of a healthy and civilizatory development.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA

RUSSIA has been led by an unlawful tendency and spirit similar to that of Servia, by that lust of conquest which is one of the oldest and strongest instincts of Muscovite power, and certainly not by the desire to help the weak and downtrodden, as seems to be asserted by the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor, when he says that he cannot endure the inglorious attack made on weak Servia, and as those English savants declare,[1] that it was not chance that brought Russia and England together, but the protection of the weak. Let me ask: Since when is that so, since when has the successor of Ivan

[1] "Why We Are at War," by members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History.

the Terrible turned Samaritan? Was Poland powerful and great when the czars reached out for her with covetous hands? Was Roumania a world power when Czar Alexander took Bessarabia away from her to recompense her for her blood shed at Plevna? Answer me, are the Russians suppressing the Finnish nation because it is strong, or because it is weak and not to be feared? How is the pretended love of the weak in the Russian heart to be reconciled with the fact that just now, during the war waged in the interest of small nations, all the political rights of the Finns have been taken away from them?

No. It is sheer irony to place the mantle of the defender of the weak on Russia's shoulder, when it is a known fact that the road of Russia's growth is paved with the broken freedom, the sufferings and the blood of her small neighbors. It is difficult seriously to refute the statement that only sympathy with the oppressed induced Russia to enter the war, even when it comes from the Czar's lips, even when venerable scientists proclaim it.

They also said, in Russia, that they could not bear the prospective sufferings of their Servian brothers; but I cannot take them seriously: history tells another tale. Not once only

did Russia cause great sufferings to other Slavs, and she was always able to endure the sufferings of others, even those of her close relations.

The Poles, the Socialists, the Russian Opposition are all Slavs, and how often did they writhe under the Cossack's knout!

Neither was Russia always quite so sensitive where Servia was concerned. Hardly had Servia thrown off the Turkish yoke after a bloody struggle (in 1812), when the Russians demanded that they again submit to their former masters. As a matter of fact the Czar's government plainly abandoned its racial relatives, leaving the Orthodox brothers to the good-will and tender mercies of the Sultan, who in a bloody fashion wreaked vengeance upon them for their fight for freedom.

Joanovich, then prime minister of Servia, writes of this: "Nine thousand Servian women and children fled to Austria, to bless the Emperor of Russia, Servia's great protector."

Russia offered us Servia on several occasions and actually delivered the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina into our hands. During the Servian-Turkish war of 1876 the Czar did not hinder the march of the Turkish host into Servia, to commit atrocities there, and very tardily only did he interfere. He thought it

sufficient to do what he could have done even in the present case, which is to say, save their bare existence. After the battle of Slivnica (Serbo-Bulgarian war) he showed absolute indifference and did not bother himself about them at all.

And when Russia, only yesterday, beheld with cold, unfeeling heart, how her enemies were tearing Bulgaria, also a Slav nation, Russia's old favorite, to pieces,—and was made nervous, for political reasons only, when Roumanian troops began to push forward,—she again proved how easily she could endure the troubles of other Slavs who are not her obedient servants.

No, Russia was not prompted by feeling, not by sympathy, not even by the objective of defense!

Russia has such gigantic defensive strength that, as long as she does not look for a clash, no one will attack her, and if she had not willed it so, she could not have been drawn into any conflict for foreign interests.

Besides, Servia, situated as she is geographically, cannot come in consideration from the viewpoint of Russia's defensive position. Owing to her excentric situation, Servia can co-operate with Russia in the offensive alone. Nowhere

does Servia block the way of an attack directed against Russia. Therefore, if Russia lays special stress on an alliance with Servia, she does so with offensive in her mind.

Neither was Russia filled with the conservative political wish to maintain the existing Eastern political balance, the *status quo*, and to prevent our supremacy, as Sasonov declared. Such he could have achieved quite easily had he recommended the acceptance of our ultimatum, which would not have rendered us more powerful, only more hated; which would not have assured us any permanent right, only a transitory one, as long as the machinations directed against us would have continued.

Thereby Russia could have saved Servia from the threatening peril to be shattered in an isolated war. She would not have foregone one whit of her own dignity by proceeding thus, for it was not she who advised the policy of aggression that led to the assassination, and it has never been looked upon in the light of weakness or humiliation in a ruler if he did not resent the avenging of the murder of princes, even though the assassins belonged to a race of which he happens to be the highest representative.

Russia's prestige would have been kept in-

tact had she but accepted our promise, given to her officially, that for her sake we would respect Servia's integrity and sovereignty also after the war. The temporary rise of our authority on the Balkan peninsula formed no such formidable danger that the horrors of a world war should have been conjured up on account of it. Why, the low state of our prestige is demonstrated by the fact that only of late the federation of the Balkan states had been formed, the purposes of which were to the greatest part directed against us.

Russia could at all times have counteracted our influence without a world war, for as soon as she became reconciled to the fact that the Eastern states had a right to live their own lives, she could certainly count on friendship among them; and it admits of no doubt that it was in Russia's power to find allies in the east Balkans as long as she was not looking for blind tools.

Sophistry is rather frequently met with in the game of diplomacy, but the statement that it was in the interest of the existing political balance and *status quo* that Russia felt obliged to extend her protection to that policy which aimed at the overthrow of that same *status quo,* and worked with revolutionary means, pur-

posely blazing the way for the battle of the nations, is quite unique.

Generally speaking, it is beyond doubt that a conservative Russian policy could only have been hampered by intimacy with Servia, which of a necessity would embroil it in such conflicts that are foreign to Russia's true interests of state, foisting upon her responsibilities that must force it from the highway of its conservatism into the byways of adventure and become the cause of the giant world power risking its existence for the sake of a little country, distantly situated.

It is therefore quite plain that only her aggressive Eastern policy formed Russia's incentive for her Serbophile policy and her interference in the interest of Servia.

To protect Servia against us is a thing worth while for Russia only if she prepares for war with us, and feels the necessity of forcing us between two fires. Servia is not important enough for Russia to go to war about, if she is not in a bellicose mood otherwise; Servia becomes important only from the moment when Russia is resolved to fight us.

It is not haphazard, but a rule, founded in the geographical situation, of Russia's Eastern policy, that whenever she wanted to progress

in peace with us she made sacrifices of Servian interests, and when she prepared to combat us she embraced Servia's interests and made them her own.

Servia's attitude and political tendency is of so much more importance to us, her neighbor, than to distant Russia, that whenever the latter was desirous to keep on good terms with us, the foremost thought in her mind was always to pay us off at the expense of Servia, to turn her over to our sphere of power, the thought which, from the time of Catherine II. down to Isvolsky, has been emerging time and time again, expressing itself in plans of partition and "parallel activity."

This situation explains it, too, that Russia tried more than once to win us over for her plans by the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other hand, it is just as natural that, as often as Russia got into opposition to us or intended to carry on a policy hostile to us, her first thought was always Servia, which from Belgrade dominates the valley of the Danube, and is able to keep up a disintegrating agitation in our own lands.

Hostile Russia's influence at our southern frontiers is so dangerous for us that I cannot imagine a Russian statesman not feeling abso-

lutely sure that if, in order to win over Servia, he supports there a policy similar to the one carried on by King Peter and Pasics, he precipitates war with us.

Every Russian politician of normal insight must have known that we consider a Russian policy such as represented by Hartwig dangerous and could not endure it for long. If Russia, nevertheless, persisted in that policy, it must be assumed that she laid more stress on her ambition than on the preservation of peace. Russia placed herself behind the Servian movement only because she had become used to the thought of the necessity of a reckoning with us.

By degrees the developments of recent years made her follow that course.

It must not be forgotten that Russia is a conquering state to her backbone. Kuropatkin, the generalissimo of Russia during the Russo-Japanese war, has figured out that of the last two hundred years Russia spent one hundred and twenty-nine fighting and only seventy-one in peace, and that for one hundred and one years she battled for territorial expansion.

A Russia of such offensive character could on very rare occasions decide to follow a truly conservative and peaceful policy, and least of all,

after a fiasco outraging her sense of honor, as was little Japan's victory.

As soon as Oyama's and Togo's victory forced her into passiveness, as soon as at Mukden the prestige of czardom, on which depends her existence, was humbled, and as soon as she saw that in far-off Asia she would, for a long time, be unable to overcome the effects of her disaster, she longed for favorable results in the Balkans. She had to seek them in new directions and by the employment of new means. If she wished to progress in the East, she necessarily had to face us and exploit the Great Servian idea.

Czarism has sacrificed much money and blood for the liberation of Eastern Orthodox races and their attachment to itself, yet all sacrifices did not bring about the desired result. On account of Europe, and principally on that of Austria-Hungary, they could not make conquests in the Balkans, and the liberated people did not voluntarily become "tools," which, according to her surprisingly naïve confession, Russia wanted to make them, for those nations wanted to live for themselves. Bismarck says in his memoirs that liberated nations are not grateful but rather arrogant. The word he uses is perhaps unjust, but the essence is true. Per-

haps it should not be called arrogance if a people which in its struggle of liberty was supported by another nation, wishes to live for its own self after it once gained its freedom.

Participation in another nation's liberation is very rarely indulged in without a selfish motive and can in no event obligate the aided one to become the obedient tool of its protector, for, in that event, it would only mean a change of masters instead of becoming free. Gratitude toward the foreign well-wisher does not exempt the government of any people from the most sacred duty to serve the great interests of its own nation above all other considerations.

Yet, however that may be, it is a doubtless fact that Russia had many bitter experiences and was forced to realize that she had performed work which was more unselfish than she willed it, and when she wanted to be of use to herself she only rendered services to others. Bismarck satirically observes that even her "only friend," the ruler of Montenegro, would serve the Russian flag only so long as he would receive compensation in money and power.

The latest "disappointment" of Russian politics proved to be Bulgaria. It came true what Andrássy prophesied to Beaconsfield during her war of liberation, on June 26, 1876, when he as-

sured him that a Bulgaria expanding over the Balkans was not dangerous and that the misgivings of the English statesman in that respect were unfounded. Andrássy then elaborated that the principal thing is not whether Bulgarian territory is made a little smaller or a little bigger, but that it be fully independent from Russian influence and that it must not absorb races different from her own: "If the wishes of the Bulgars are satisfied, and especially if their frontiers will not be traced in an over-niggardly manner, it is to be foreseen that their longing for independence will be uppermost in them. Many are the instances in history that demonstrate the ingratitude of nations."

Russia was bound to realize that her policy of liberation did not bring her the results she expected, and, besides, to deduce the moral that if she did not wish to lose the price of her sacrifices she must first break us, who would always prevent her from bending the Eastern States into that state of abject obedience which they are not willing to yield from their own volition, and to force from them by the knout of the Cossack that gratitude which the Balkan people could not sincerely and voluntarily feel.

The St. Petersburg cabinet was facing a vexing alternative. It was either to give up the

hope that through the protectorate over the Eastern Balkan nations her power would establish an offensive base sufficient to permit her to dominate the Dardanelles and to attack Austria-Hungary from the rear, or to risk war with us.

When she not only remained neutral in the last Turkish war which was waged by the Balkan Federation, but, moreover, assumed the stand that even in the event of a victory won by the Christian arms the *status quo* must be reestablished, it seemed that Russia would renounce her Eastern ambitions and enter a new political era. To our regret this was an illusion.

Russia had decided on war with our monarchy and, therefore, as a matter of necessity, made Servia her protégée, alliance with whom became of inestimable value in the event of such a war, while it possessed hardly any, if there was to be no war.

Servia was the last remaining among the Balkan states for Russian politics to make use of. Not from gratitude, for during King Milan's time the Servian nation furnished a classic example of so-called ingratitude, but for the simple reason that Servia, too, wanted to expand at our cost and thought to be able to gain her end only if protected by Russia. Formerly Russia

relied on the Balkan people's longing for liberty; to-day that has been turned against her and she can only expect assistance from the excessive ambition of individual Eastern nations.

That was the reason why the Great-Servian idea became valuable in Russia's eyes, and why Russia's ambition used Servia's ambition as its tool; it is why czarism has borne with revolutionary Servia, although it abhors revolution. It feared that if it does not save Servia from the injurious consequences of her murders, it would lose its last obedient servant in the East, the last Archimedean point, leaning upon which she could lift the existing balance of power from its angle.

Russia has often come close to the realization of her traditional purposes in the East, but in the last moment the prey always escaped. To-day the last aid of her old ambition, Servia, could have been lost to her aggressive tendency, but she did not want to permit such a thing and rather took the chances of war. The near past had shaken her prestige, but she had borne up under the drubbing, realizing her own weakness. Now she thought herself strong enough to regain her shrunken glory and to batter down, by a final victory, those obstacles of her old impulses, her national ideals—the great

powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, her neighbors.

To all this comes the Pan-Slav feeling and the bitterness which has accumulated against us and against the Germans.

On the banks of the Neva we have never been forgiven Aehrenthal's diplomatic victory over Isvolsky. The bitter feeling has also increased against Germany; not only for having been our second in the campaign of annexation but also on account of her policy befriending Turkey. In the circles of the Entente legends have originated about German ambition. It was a mote in St. Petersburg's eye that Germany, in the course of events, had become Turkey's best friend, and it came to eagerly believe the fairy tale of the Paris and London press relating how Emperor William intended to acquire Asia Minor and the region of the Bagdad railway.

Just as in the case of our presumed Saloniki aspirations, they never stopped to think about the manifest contradiction which exists between that supposed ambition and the Turkish friendship in fact existing; they made others believe, and finally they believed themselves, that the German Emperor coveted possessions of him, whom he tried to make strong and capable of resistance.

Nobody is in a better position than Russian public opinion to know that a government never contributes to the strengthening of a country on whose downfall it counts and whose heir it aspires to become.

That same public opinion could also not fail to remember that Russia, when it was about to prepare Poland for her own purposes, did everything to maintain the "liberum veto" and anarchy, which incapacitated Poland. Neither could it have forgotten with how much energy the autocratic Czar espoused the privileges of the Swedish aristocracy, knowing that they crippled Sweden's war strength. And it certainly remembers how painstakingly he took care of Turkey's centrifugal elements, and when on one solitary occasion he did take the Sultan's side, it was only to prevent his rival, the Khedive of Egypt, from giving new force, rejuvenation to Islam.

Therefore, they must have well known in Russia that the German efforts to strengthen the Turkish army and navy did not originate from a desire of conquest at the cost of Turkey, but that such was done to insure her alliance, and because Germany counted also on the economic advantage resulting from that friendship.

They must have known that Germany could not possibly covet possessions in Asia Minor, from which she would be separated by Southern Europe, Gibraltar, and British Sea power.

But the Entente, assisted by the great suggestive power always commanded by Paris, by the great echo, which is assured to the voice of England throughout her colonies in all parts of the world, kept on trumpeting the story of the Eastern aspirations of the German Emperor until it was believed far and wide, which only increased the nervousness of Russian public opinion and its anti-German attitude.

Under their effect the Czar again became the confederate of revolutionaries, although the bloody corpse of Alexander II. could have easily convinced him how dangerous it is for an autocrat to act the champion of liberty.

Under such impulses did Russia risk her whole existence, although a policy of peace and the utilization of her inner resources would have raised her to the position of the greatest world power. Doing so, perhaps she followed a course that may be historically explained and understood from a general ethnological point of view, but the cause which prompted her cannot, in its moral value, be compared to that which has been our guiding star.

CHAPTER V

FRANCE AND JAPAN

THE participation of France in the war is excusable. Everybody knew that as soon as the Russian army would begin to march against Germany, the idea of "Revanche" would immediately take hold of the French nation again.

It came true, what Bismarck had foretold decades ago, when he said that France would attack as soon as she could hope for a result, as soon as she would trust in victory, as soon as there would be war between Germany and Russia.

The "sacred fire of revenge" of which Bismarck spoke thirty years ago has been burning to this day, and in France's political life the advice given to the nation by Gambetta, "Never

speak of war, but always think of it," still ruled.

France would as soon have renounced herself and her future if, after the efforts of many years, she would have remained neutral, contrary to her agreement with Russia. True, the war was begun for interests independent of her own, even for such *against* which French blood was shed more than once, but when this war, well prepared in a diplomatic manner, waked the hope in the French that this was their opportunity to wipe out the shame of the war of '70 and again to become a leading power, their action was natural and a matter of course.

Still they, too, were led by offensive purposes, merely by a desire of conquest. Germany did not threaten, did not imperil the security of France. Germany had not the faintest notion to attack France to take something from her; she wanted nothing but to gain her friendship. For a very long time it was the present German Emperor's main object to reconcile the French.

I must not fail to point out that France is led by the desire to reconquer such provinces which were originally *German* and which she only lost through her own fault, the third Napoleon's attack and flighty policy, so that the French Premier's (Viviani's) declaration, "France, unjustly provoked, did not want this war; she did

everything to avoid it. As long as it was forced upon her she will defend herself," is really nothing but claptrap, for nobody forced her into this war if not she herself.

To discuss the moral value of Japan's attack is superfluous, in my opinion. Everybody is satisfied that she had no other cause for the attack but her lust of conquest. Besides, Japan herself does not deny it. She did not refer to her agreement with England, but with a cynical ultimatum demanded of Germany the surrender of Kiao-chau without having the faintest vestige of a legal title to support her.

Japan was not ashamed to be sincere. She has no scruples in her actions against foreigners, least of all against white races.

As it is, nobody was astonished at Japan's cynicism, and the only curious thing is that her allies have the hardihood to judge in such a superior manner over the procedure of Germany and the moral foundations of her policies.

The members of the Oxford faculty observe a strict silence regarding Japan, but they are very much mistaken if they believe that by such silence they shield their right to judge the living and the dead from their exalted seat on a high hobby horse.

CHAPTER VI

ENGLAND

UNLIKE France, England was not bound by treaties of alliance to intervene, neither had she an affair of honor in suspense, as had the former owner of Alsace-Lorraine. She was also not actuated by ancient, great national traditions or the feeling of racial kinship, like Russia. In the past England's great wars were waged against the French and the Russians, not Germany or Austria-Hungary. Neither could she have been led on by the thirst of conquest which impelled Japan, for England might lose much more than she could gain. Where in all the world could she add another India, Egypt or Australia to her possessions, while she undoubtedly risks them in a war. As mistress of the greatest empire known

to mankind, she could have afforded to be conservative.

What was it then, which, nevertheless, induced far-seeing and cautious England to follow a policy—to which, since the battle of Waterloo, she could only once make up her mind and then against Russia—of taking part in a continental war as the ally of her former enemies, France and Russia? Let us consider the explanation, offered in defense of England's course, by the professors of Oxford, in the work to which I already had occasion to refer. They make the violation of Belgian neutrality the main issue. The essence of their argument is that the basic principle of England's internal as well as foreign policy is the rule of the law and the protection of the weak, and is what she is fighting for now. As so often in the past, she again battles for justice against brutal odds, on the side of little Belgium and the principle which was violated in her, against German militarism. The English scholars draw a dark picture—as a sort of contrast to their own splendor and glory, and to emphasize the lofty principles animating their own land—of Prussian unscrupulous love of conquest, proving from the martial works of Treitschke and Bernhardi that the sole aim of the German Empire has always been ter-

ritorial conquest, and its only principle at all times self-interest. According to them the case of Belgium is a revolting instance of that spirit.

As they have it, England's principle is "my right is also my interest," and Germany's, "my interest is also my right."

The mere coining of a phrase for a set purpose does not, in itself, make it in the least conform with historical truth and the events of our days.

The past of England is not as the Oxford professors see it, and her present is also something entirely different. England's foreign policies have never been and are not now conducted by unselfish idealism. It is a fact that the cornerstone of her internal politics is reverence of the law, but only in regions inhabited by Anglo-Saxons; not everywhere; not where the interests of power demand something else. There is no one holding the English in higher respect than I, who consider the results achieved by England the greatest that humanity has so far been able to show in the way of internal government methods, for they have been able to combine the most extensive liberty and self-government with force, order and the most complete rule of the law. The fact of the British World Empire is in itself proof of wonderful virtues

and great qualities. Yet, notwithstanding all those merits, England's foreign policy is not swayed by principles one whit more elevated than that of any other nation.

It is true that on more than one occasion England took up the cudgel in defense of small countries, but that was only when her interests demanded it, when her position was imperiled by a continental great power. Where, however, her interests were different, as they usually were, away from the Continent of Europe, her methods, too, became different ones.

There is no other state which conquered as many small peoples, races and nations, and more than once by employing the greatest cruelty and perfidy, than England, the defender of the weak.

Who could fail to remember the conquests of Clive and Hastings, the classic description in which Macaulay made us acquainted with the crimes of the formation of the Indian Empire, and the war, the origin of which was that England forced the opium import upon China for business reasons? Who could have forgotten the Draconic severity shown at the time of the Sepoy revolt, which only explains that England is also obeying that "supreme law" which she took so ill of the Germans? Her proceeding

against the Boers also shows that however great England's respect for the rights of small countries may be, it is less than that for her own interests and her gold mines.

But that could not be otherwise.

Great Britain is the greatest empire founded so far by man. Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne, Djengis-Khan, Tamerlane and Napoleon did not at any time rule over a territory such as England had subjugated by her consistent, slow labors of centuries. Only Russia approaches England in the proportions of her conquests.

For this reason it is natural that those two countries had most wars during the last centuries and that in their foreign policies they showed the least scrupulosity.

The learned men of Oxford would put us under great obligation could they but explain how and wherefrom England could in all the corners of the earth have acquired those indubitable rights, by the mere defense of which she founded the greatest empire of all times, if not by robbery, as did all other conquerors, and point out the paragraph of international law which secured for the British lion such a large portion of the mainland and the sway over the seven seas, if not the right of the stronger.

I am also anxious to be informed how the love England bears for the weaker races could have led her to the subjugation of so many of them.

Never was world power created by the respect of international law, by the defense of minor races, and never will be; and while I am willing to admit that more than once Anglo-Saxon energy has been able to accomplish results bordering on the miraculous, it has never performed wonders. Not I, but an Anglo-Saxon writes thus of Great Britain: "By wars and conquests, by theft and intrigue, by the brutal use of physical power, was it put together piece by piece." [1] Which is absolutely true and only requires the supplement that it took more conquests and intrigues for the English to build up an empire so much bigger than those of the rest. Not I, but an Englishman of Oxford, F. E. Smith, says: "We rose to Imperial greatness by carrying out the same principles," principles which to-day are cast in Germany's teeth.

The English are one of the greatest conquering races of mankind. Their virtues and faults are those of a conqueror. Their greatest quality is their practical sense, and it strikes one rather odious, if Englishmen attempt to drape

[1] Homer Lea: "The Day of the Saxon."

an idealistic cloak around their national type. Why should they yearn for phantom glories when they have so many genuine and true merits? The statement that England was led into this war by her desire to defend the weak against the strong, becomes amusing when we behold her leaguing herself with giant Russia, France and Japan against unproportionately smaller countries, attacking one hundred and forty million people with seven to eight hundred millions.

Just as false is the picture drawn of Germany by the Oxford literati. Since the days of the Hohenstaufens the Germans have not been a conquering nation at all. Even admitting that Frederick II., the great Prussian king, was not scrupulous, and that the re-establishment of the German Empire in the days of Bismarck and Moltke has cost much blood and suffering, it cannot be denied that the supremacy of Germany in Europe is accompanied by less war than the domination of any other country.

It is a historic fact that French supremacy has caused ceaseless conflicts in the times of Louis XIV., Napoleon I. and Napoleon III.; in the times of Bismarck and William II. the leading position of the Germans guaranteed the peace. It is unparalleled in history that a

power, after such splendid victories as had been those of '66 and '70 and with the attacking strength possessed by it, should preserve uninterrupted peace for forty-three years, as was done by Germany, and permit that her vanquished foe found the second largest colonial empire, and anyhow big enough for England to grab the best part of Africa, herself remaining satisfied with a very small share.

Reference to Treitschke and Bernhardi proves naught as to the martial spirit and quarrelsome nature of the Germans. The intellectual bent of a nation of sixty to seventy millions cannot be disposed of by the works of one or two writers. Least of all by Bernhardi, who himself says that his nation does not follow his principles, that it is too peace-loving, who criticizes the axioms expressed of war by the nation's leaders, by Bismarck and Bethmann-Hollweg. The type of German thought is truly not represented by those authors, but rather by Bismarck and the present emperor; the iron chancellor, whose teaching was that one must not begin a war for imaginary danger, questions of prestige or to forestall a probable hostile attack of the future, but only for such national interests of vital importance that can finally and favorably be solved by the sword

alone, and William II., who has emphasized on innumerable occasions that he deems peace to be the greatest of all national boons, who in his first speech declared that he would not use his army for attack, but only for the defense of Germany and her allies, and who, true to those noble and truthful words, was able to preserve the world's peace down to the present time.

There is no manner of doubt about it that Germany's behavior toward Belgium offends against international law. To argue this would be waste of time; the German government does not deny it, and it is just as uncontradictable that the fate of Belgium is the saddest page of this war's history. Still there is onesidedness and exaggeration in the great indignation shown by England. I dare say there is no state which would have acted differently if actual military issues of a prominent nature would have demanded it, and that there are very few states that have not committed similar acts. When civilized, great governments have once arrived at the extreme resolution to commit wholesale murder, to expose the fruit of many generations' labor to destruction, to risk masses of their sons' lives, when the fate of gigantic fortunes is at stake, and the very existence of nations becomes a matter of doubt—then it becomes impossible

to shun anything which is in any manner necessary to assure final victory. It is a stern duty of any government in such a predicament to strive for nothing but victory, and anyone who would in any manner lag therein, would ruin his own nation and commit an unpardonable sin against his race.

Which state can boast that it never attacked a people which wished to stay neutral? Never forced a country into war which wanted to keep out of it, and never violated international rules during warfare? England has less right than any other nation to be roused by Germany's action toward Belgium, for it committed a very similar crime, when, in 1807, it attacked neutral Denmark because it had been reported that Napoleon I. would seize Denmark's fleet and use it against her.

England then made the demand that Denmark deliver over her fleet, and, when this was declined, the British Admiral immediately proceeded to shoot up the city of Copenhagen and took the ships by force. When Canning, the great British Minister, was apprehended in Parliament for that lawless attack, he asked back proudly and impressively whether England would have preferred to collapse under Napoleon's attack, with eyes undivertibly fixed

upon Puffendorf's works and International Law. Canning referred to other precedents, too, pointing out that in 1801 neutral Madeira and in 1806 neutral Lisbon was only taken by the English to anticipate the French. And Canning remained the pride of England; her historians afterwards approved of his course, holding that without such brutal aggression Napoleon would have gotten the start of them and with the aid of the Danish ships would have attacked England.

Now, if England had a right to attack neutral Denmark, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had made no hostile overtures, only for the reason that the rights of self-defense and survival are paramount, then let me inquire, how can she deny that right to Germany? Do not Canning's words imply the vindication of Bethmann-Hollweg?

Furthermore, that not every Anglo-Saxon judged as severely as the Oxford professors is shown by the following statement of Homer Lea: "The neutrality of a minor state, once it is included in the theater of war waged between greater nations, becomes an anomaly. A kingdom in such a position invariably constitutes an area over which war is waged until one or the other combatant is capable of incorporating it

within his base and forcing the conflict into the territories of the enemy."

Now let me ask: does England hold the paragraphs of international law and the rights of neutrals on the seas in due respect at least now, when she alleges to have entered the war for the protection of the rights of the neutrals? Or did Russia, England's ally, always respect international law? Did she do so when she concededly violated the Paris agreement in 1870, or when in 1876 she broke the neutrality of the lower Danube? Or has perhaps her other friend, the France of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. a right to judge over others, because she always respected the weak and the law of the nations?

The statement, furthermore, that Great Britain entered the war on account of Belgium is absolutely erroneous.

It may be plainly seen from the facts published by the English men of science that Lord Grey was resolved not to tolerate the vanquishment of France under any circumstances, and not to bind himself to neutrality.

When on July 29th the German Chancellor tries to negotiate with Goschen, the British Ambassador, in the interest of British neutrality, the Ambassador says that, according to his belief, his government would not bind itself to

anything; not on account of the individual conditions which Germany placed in view, but *generally.* At that time Grey warns Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, that as soon as France would be embroiled in the war, England would have to interfere.

And in his answer given on July 30th to the German inquiry Grey clearly states that England would in no event give a declaration of neutrality and will not permit France to be vanquished to a degree that she would lose her position as a great power, even though the German government should guarantee the maintenance of the European integrity of France. He adds that it would be a shame for England to make agreements at the cost of France, and for that reason England would reserve her freedom of action.

On July 31st Grey announces to Lichnowsky that if it comes to war between Germany and France, he would be involved, and that the fate of Belgium would be an important, though not decisive, factor as far as his attitude is concerned.

On August 1st Grey answered Lichnowsky's question as to whether, in the event of German recognition of Belgian neutrality, England would bind herself to remain neutral, as fol-

lows: "I replied that I could not say that. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we should give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to be neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

From all this it is evident that it was impossible to insure the neutrality of England at any cost, that England felt herself to be one with France to such extent that she would not permit the latter's defeat even should Germany promise to respect France's integrity in Europe and abroad and that of Belgian territory. That much is proven besides by the fact that before the violation of Belgian rights and independently therefrom the English government promises on August 3d that it would stand beside France if the German fleet should attack the

French coast from the North Sea or through the Channel.

Those who to-day are shedding tears over Belgium forget that they, too, are responsible for the sufferings of that unhappy land, which they could have easily saved it.

If England would have really been led by the interests of little Belgium and would have wanted nothing but to defend international rights, then she ought to have grabbed Lichnowsky's offer with both hands; in that case England should have done as she did in 1870, when she treated both belligerents in a like manner and was inclined to bind herself to neutrality toward that party which would respect Belgium's neutrality and to turn against the one violating it.

England has so little defended the interest of Belgium that, by her course, she directly harmed her and made the preservation of Belgium's neutrality a matter of difficulty. If England declares herself neutral, Germany could have more easily foregone the military occupation of Belgium, than if she is forced to figure with England's interference. In the former eventuality the neutrality of Belgium would only have carried the disadvantage to make victory harder, while in the latter she would have

exposed herself to the danger that, during an aggravated advance, England could have attacked the exhausted German army from the rear, through Belgium.

Therefore, England did not interfere on account of Belgium; she has no right to bemoan her or play the rôle of the champion of the innocent and the weak before an audience composed of the neutral nations, for she has harmed Belgium, and it was she who had dragged that unfortunate country into the peril from which she was unable to extricate it.

Still, even though I am unable to accept the argument set forth in defense of England, I cannot fully adopt the explanation circulated in Germany and Austria-Hungary regarding England's policies. I do not believe that England intended to precipitate the war.

During the last Eastern war she admonished the other powers of the Entente to keep cool. She assumed the part of the intermediator. She tried to approach Germany. Understandings were reached regarding certain questions interesting Germany and England. It is my impression that even in the present conflict she did not wish to cause war and would have preferred if we would, by compliance, have avoided it.

I cannot make myself believe that Albion,

goaded on solely by the mean-grasping spirit of a shopkeeper, should have knowingly looked about for a cause of war, in order to choke her competitor in blood, as is held by many.

It is hard for me to imagine that in an economic contest, not founded on monopolies gained by conquests, but carried on with the means of science, industriousness, and labor, England should deliberately have wanted to participate with steel and dynamite, for war's cost is so stupendously great, requiring no end of material sacrifices, and its outcome is so uncertain, that it cannot be assumed that on account of economic rivalry a calculating state should even dream of risking a clash like this one of to-day.

There are such economic aims that may rightfully constitute the chief purpose of a nation's foreign politics. It may be readily understood, for instance, that England in the eighteenth century defended herself, when she had to, sword in hand, against the danger of having her American colonies cut off by the French from their natural background, the direction of their expansion and commerce—the American continent. Thus it could also be understood that Japan, and then Italy, looked for a new home for her overcrowded population near to the

mother land. But England has no economic interest, pointed against Germany, which could have become the leading motive of her policies. German colonies nowhere block the way of the necessary development of English colonies; Germany owns no territory which could be wanted by a surplus of England's population.

Nowhere and in no manner does German territory impede the ever wonderful development of England's natural resources. The industrial development of Germany threatened only the interests of English great capital, and caused only that English capital engaged in export and English commerce will not be able to secure that excessive portion of the growing international trade which it could have assured for itself without the wonderful rise of Germany, and that German competition will rob it of part of the expected profit. It was mainly a question of corporation and capital dividends, for which to sacrifice the life of millions and risk the property of countless small existences would be a crime and evidence of moral decline.

Besides, while Germany's economic development was enormous as measured by European standards, it was by no means so overwhelming as to drive England rightfully into the arms of despair. The total external commerce of Ger-

many grew faster than even that of America, but not her export, which is usually the only thing to excite the envy of rivals, because that could only harm the other's export trade.

In 1887 Germany's total foreign trade amounted to 1,669 million dollars; that of the United States, 1,479 million dollars. Ten years later (in 1897) Germany's was 2,236 millions, while that of the United States amounted to 1,906 millions. In 1906 Germany shows 3,893 millions; America, 3,119 millions.[1]

The export increase shows, however, in favor of America, as compared with Germany, for while German export trade increased in twenty years from 841 million dollars to 1,718 millions, American exports jumped from 752 millions to 1,831 millions, leaving in that respect Germany way behind.

England's export to Germany amounted in 1903 to 115 million dollars, and in 1913 had increased to 200 millions; her export to the United States was 110 millions in 1903, and in 1913 not more than 145 millions.[2]

Soberly speaking, German economic rise could not have caused war with Germany. If the economic progress of any country could have be-

[1] Computed from German official figures.

[2] "Statesman's Yearbook," 1904 and 1914.

come a cause of war, then the impetuous development of America and the incalculable outlook of her future could much sooner have been such than the progress of Germany, which, owing to its natural situation, in spite of its swiftness and impressive nature, remains more limited than that of the United States.

Neither do I know of any political interest that should make England an enemy to Germany. It is evident that up to now either France or Russia had been England's enemy, but neither Austria nor Prussia. The legendary figures of Edward I. and III. and the Black Prince fought in France; the first manifestation of French national feeling occurred in a war against England, under the standards of the Maid of Orleans. William III., Marlborough, Nelson and Wellington were all fighting France. The aim of both Pitts was the defeat of France. From France the English wrested India and Canada, and who was their chief rival in Egypt but France? Against Prussia or Austria they went only if one of them was the ally of Spain or France, but never on account of having been forced by a clash of interests.

Rivalry with the French had become second nature with English society; to such extent that on several occasions it became fairly hyp-

notized by its fear of French danger in times of peace.

On three occasions the power of the French caused panicky feelings in London. The first panic broke out in 1847 when they armed themselves head over heels against Louis Philippe. Some had gone as far as to figure out the exact date of the French invasion, and no less a man than Wellington proved that England could not defend herself properly against France. The second panic happened after Napoleon III.'s *coup d'état;* the third in 1860 when Napier, another prominent British general, sounded the tocsin, and Palmerston made the observation that the invention of steam had put an end to the protection which the sea had offered. Fortresses were erected, warships built, militia regiments organized and the nation was playing soldiers all along the line against France just as when Roberts demanded the introduction of compulsory service on account of Germany yesterday.

Nevertheless the anxiety was well founded. Supremacy of France imperils England's security.

Germany strives, with appalling blood sacrifices, to gain possession of those ports from which she could most easily reach the English coast and which are either on French territory

or close by. Germany can come into the possession of those war bases only by conquest, while they are at all times at France's disposal. And as there is much more racial kinship between Belgium and France than between Belgium and Germany, the Belgian ports could have easier become French than German.

It is true that since 1870 French supremacy was not to be feared, as it amounted to little more than historic past, but the situation could easily change if the French were again victorious, which would return to French genius the buoyancy, self-trust and self-assertion, the daring flight it had of yore. And in that new France again advancing to the Rhine, the aspirations for the lands surrounding the estuary of that river, to which Gallic imagination is bound by the memory of so much glory, so much tragedy and bloodshed, will surely reawaken.

A more dangerous effect, however, than that of a French victory would result for England by a Russian triumph, which to-day she is promoting with money and blood, because Russia is in a better position to gain supremacy and because Russian state interests are at variance with those of England. Russia threatens Great Britain's most important colonies. India in the first place, where the victorious Czar could

much easier send hundreds of thousands of troops, by means of the railway connection now in course of construction, than he could have sent in the time of Palmerston or Disraeli; or than he was able to send to Manchuria against the Japanese. Then Egypt is also threatened by the excessive power of the czars, through defeated Turkey and the Dardanelles. The annexation of Persia and part of Arabia would not equalize the chances of England and Russia on those battlefields because there Russia would derive irresistible strength by the oneness of her empire. Compact and immense Russia, territorially united and connected by railways, morally unified by victory, harking to a single word of authority, would have an enormous advantage over the comparatively narrow strip of land wedged between herself and the sea, the British Empire, geographically and constitutionally parceled out, piecemealed, as it were.

The rule of the seas would not help England much, for it could only be turned to account after the Russian hosts would have reached their goal, the last boundary line of British possessions, the seacoast. Decisive battles would have to be fought on land, and there always Russia will be the stronger.

A Russian victory would, besides, increase the

Czar's naval power. If after defeating the Germans it would plant its foot at the Baltic and after vanquishing the Turks, in the Dardanelles, then North and South Russia would have a closed sea for the development of her fleet. Impregnable bulwarks would defend her seas and ports, while from her powerful offensive portals she could attack the British isles and England's most important naval position, the Suez Canal.

Owing to this situation it was until quite recent times a generally accepted dogma of English politics that they required the counteracting influence of Austria-Hungary and the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. I do not comprehend what caused England's complete change of front and why Asquith and Grey should have wished to bring sacrifices of blood for the realization of such a matter, fighting against for what Palmerston and Russell had dared to spill English blood.

The motives still exist on account of which they wanted to induce our Monarchy in 1876 and 1877 to interfere in the Russian-Turkish war and to refuse permission for the Russian army to cross the Balkans, or to invest Constantinople for even one day; on account of which motives England protested against Russia's extending her war operations to Gallipoli, the Persian

Gulf or the Suez Canal, and before making her appearance at the Berlin Conference demanded security from the Russians that the frontiers of Bulgaria would extend no farther than the Balkan Mountains.

The impartial principles of Eastern politics surely do not insist that England shed her blood to-day in order that Bosnia and Herzegovina become Servian, when a few decades before she proposed to turn those two provinces over to us that they may not become Servian.

Therefore, the motives of Eastern politics did not lead England into taking up a position opposed to us and Turkey on the Russian side. On the contrary, those motives called for an alliance with us.

The Oxford professors—besides the liberty of Belgium—state the necessity of preserving the balance of power to be one of the factors influencing England's policies. But that argument also lacks foundation.

King Edward, when he started his anti-German policies, may actually have believed that Russia, on account of her weakness, would be harmless for a long time to come, and that, therefore, the European balance is threatened by Germany alone; but since then the situation has changed. To-day everybody can see that

Russia, with her immense population, great territorial expansion and by means of the moral power which she may exert over Slavs and Orthodox believers, could, after she has once defeated her Western neighbors and brought the seas surrounding their coasts under her dominion, acquire such power, the like of which has never existed in Europe before, which could not be acquired by any other nation, not even by the German.

It is a fact that to-day Germany is the greatest military power, but only because Russia's crude strength, her military and economic capital is still unorganized.

Germany, situated in the middle of Europe and surrounded by a number of hostile nations, cannot even in the event of her victory become such a menace to the European balance as the Muscovite giant.

It would, therefore, have to be termed really shortsighted policy to promote Russian victory in the name of the balance of power, which to overthrow definitely and completely is only within the power of the triumphant Russian Empire.

Besides, he would very erroneously interpret English history who believes that England attacked another country at any time because it

was more powerful than the rest and rapidly progressing, or that England had ever fought for the freedom of continental states and for the abstract principle of the balance of power. Those wars which we usually ascribe to have been waged for the European balance, are, properly speaking, fights against the leading states of Europe in defense of England's interests.

I do not desire to enter upon lengthy historic discussions, but only wish to point out that in each case when England began a war with a great continental power, she always defended actual, real economic or politic interests.

It was thus when Queen Elizabeth made war against Philip II. and annihilated his "Invincible" Armada. Then Spain represented the political principle which was in diametric opposition to Queen Elizabeth's Protestant England, i. e., Catholic reactionarism.

Philip II. also conspired with Mary Stuart and other Catholic elements against Elizabeth's throne, to win back the position which he enjoyed when his wife, Mary of bloody memory, had been England's ruler. In the interest of the freedom of her own development, in the interest of the possibility of following the direction mapped out by herself, England turned against Philip and hastened to the aid of Dutch

Protestantism. How can one attempt to compare the causes of that justified and defensive war to those of to-day?

Serious interests of England had also been endangered when she began her long wars against Louis XIV. in 1688. King Louis lusted for the domination of Europe, for individual rule; had a bigger navy than England, also wished to conquer Holland and Belgium and to control that part of the coast from where the invasion of England is least difficult. Besides, he claimed the succession in Spain for himself and desired to acquire the imperial crown of Germany.

The limitless ambition of the "Sun king" (Roi Soleil) made a great impression on the internal politics of England. By means of corruption he organized a party and supported James II., the enemy of Protestantism and constitutional liberty, so that the freedom of England's progress and her external affairs equally called for the war begun by William of Orange and continued by Marlborough. The war against the French revolution was also nourished by internal reasons, originating with the fear that the revolutionary propaganda might strike across at the island kingdom and sweep away royalty. In the anti-Napoleonic wars the boundless ambition of the great general furnished continuous kindling

matter. Independent political existence, outside of his own, became something unimaginable, as any other state had to become either his enemy or his servant.

All the cases mentioned are, therefore, no precedents of to-day's conflict, and it is in vain if the leaders of this war recall their popularity.

England was not always the enemy of the most powerful state of the continent.

On the contrary, on more than one occasion she became the ally of the strongest state.

Thus, during the time of the first great victories of Charles V., Henry VIII. was his ally against the French, although the greatest peril to European freedom threatened in Charles' victory.

During the Thirty Years' War Cromwell supported that France which had already become the strongest state of Europe, and which had by the aid of England acquired that gigantic power through which she, under the leadership of Louis XIV., was menacing the freedom of Europe.

England also supported Czar Nicholas and Napoleon III. when they played the leading part in the European concert.

English public opinion has always insisted that a war in which it is to become engaged, must

be one fought for real, downright English interests.

In the decisions and foreign policy of France, general principles vanish; the wish to be a benefactress, to be providential, plays the most important part. Thus the foreign policy of the great revolution stood under the propaganda of the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity," but England never allowed her politics to become axiomatic, and the foreign policies were always pursued in an egotistic manner. She never jeopardized her existence for anything but her own great interests, which, by the way, I consider a much more salutary thing to do than the policy of trying to make everybody happy.

In the present war the real interest, the German attack, which justified the wars of the past, is wholly lacking.

German mothers do not sin against the English nation by bearing more children than the French, neither do German knowledge and industry by making their nation wealthy and powerful. Even a mighty German fleet is no provocation of England, and it is no violation of English rights if Emperor William dared to think of acquiring colonies.

The fleet and the colonies are natural consequences of the rapid development of German

industries and not the outcome of some anti-English policy.

A country, the economic circulation beyond the seas and the foreign trade of which has grown day by day, must needs have tried to dispose over such naval power which should be able to defend its interests in such distant countries. By an imposing appearance of such naval power it ought to give weight to its word and connections and to promote its further development without intending to menace any other state by the display of its strength.

England has no monopoly to rule the world. Who wants to assert himself, who becomes wealthy and occupies a corresponding position among the governments of the earth, does not thereby attack England.

If England could be imperiled by the natural growth of other nations, then England's power would be in contrast with world freedom. If the building of a navy, accompanying a defensive conservative policy and the protection of a rapidly developing trade mean the provocation of England, then England's power means the serfdom of the world.

Germany did not venture into the field of colonial aspiration in a high-handed manner; she threatened no one's rights. None of her colonies

endangers that of any other country, or blocks its natural development. It does not amount to a vital interest of Germany to acquire colonies in haste and at any price. Why, Germany has no emigration to speak of; the magic power of her great economic uplift has put a stop to her former prodigious emigration.

Hence Germany is not in a state of necessity to acquire, sword in hand, new homelands for her population, as more than one country has been doing during the last few decades without awakening the jealousy of the world. Yet Germany, and rightfully too, desires to insure for herself the possibility to expand her possessions beyond the sea, always respecting the rights of other countries. And foremostly she may rightfully claim to be allowed to protect her economic interests, growing from day to day, by her own means and to make it possible, by the acquisition of naval stations, for 70 million Germans to exert power in distant lands.

When she developed her maritime power for such purpose she did not endanger anybody's lawful interests. If it was permissible for America to build a bigger navy than Germany's, prompted by the same impetus, if it was right for Japan to become a sea power, Germany certainly was at liberty to do the same. In

England they looked askew at Germany's Moroccan policy and called it provoking, but undeservedly. Germany restricted herself to see that she be not disposed of without having a word in it, and that no new map be made where she, too, had considerable economic interests. She did not permit France simply to push her aside and discard her in view of the advantages the latter had accorded to England. Germany mainly desired to prove that such could not be done henceforth, that she, too, amounted to something, and that she, too, had a right to be of some account in world politics and beyond the sea.

The French themselves are boasting that at the Moroccan deal they fared better than the Germans. They saw therein a superiority of their diplomacy and the first victory over the Germans since '70. I actually do believe that they had the better of Germany in that transaction. But if that is so, how can they maintain that Germany hinders them and the English in their natural development, that Germany's supremacy cannot be endured, that Germany is overexacting? If powerful Germany was satisfied with the smaller portion, if it was possible to counteract her will in a diplomatic manner, how can they speak of the oppressive superior-

ity of Germany and how can the English government make public opinion believe that it fights for the freedom of Europe? The very example of Morocco proves that when Germany had made up her mind to take her place in the sun, she did not want to crowd anyone out of theirs. She did not desire a bigger space than the others, but only what she needed and what she deemed right.

Now, after all this has been said, the question still persists: what led England into war if not international law, not Belgium, not her sovereign or economic interests, not the protection of Europe's balance of power, not the aggression of Germany? According to my conviction, only the consequences of her course followed in the past. She was shuffled into it solely by the situation created through her former attitude and diplomatic pose. It is nothing but the first-fruits of her own sins.

Economic jealousy, aversion against a successful competitor, nervousness caused by the building of the German fleet, alarm felt at the thought of German domination, and, I am very much afraid, the personal feelings of King Edward placed England with the Entente, probably without then intending to begin a war. But that does not save her, for she must have known

that it is easier to start an avalanche than to stop it, and that it is easier to bring two great nations into opposition to each other than to estimate the consequence of such contrast in advance, and she ought to have known that it would be easier to break the German nation and the German Emperor than to humiliate them.

It came to pass, as Bismarck, the great discerner of the psychology of the nations, explained, when in one of his speeches he said: "Don't for one moment believe that if such a policy is once wrongfully started you could return from every way station; such is impossible. The policy of two neighboring great powers may be compared with the situation of two travelers in a desolate forest, who do not know each other, and of whom neither fully trusts the other; if one of them should put his hand in his pocket, the other cocks his pistol, and when he hears the click of the other's hammer, he fires. Thus it is with powers, each of which bears influence upon the decisions of the other; there we ought studiously to avoid the first distrust and the first dissonance in the other if we desire to remain good friends."

The truth of this has again been proven by the fate of England and Germany. The alienation of the two kindred nations gradually increased,

bringing forth growing distrust, antipathy and diplomatic collisions, which heaped up more new kindling stuff, until at last, the war, which none of them wanted to cause, broke out.

Many Germans saw the principal enemy in England and—I think erroneously—believed that England was resolved to attack the growing German navy at the first opportune moment, and at the same time English public opinion came under the influence of the apprehension of German invasion. One reaches for his gun and the other fires.

Lord Roberts conducted a veritable campaign to awaken England's jealousy and distrustfulness of Germany. With the aid of his great reputation, by his popularity increased by victorious wars, he proclaimed that Germany intended to attack England and that the aim of the building of the fleet is the vanquishing of England. He said that as soon as Germany would be ready, she would attack at once. According to him Bismarck and Moltke did the same thing in '66 and '70, and Germany would pursue the same course in future.

Party politics made capital out of Roberts' anxiety. For years the Unionists attacked Asquith that he did not take good enough care of the island's defensive interests. One of the

panics, mentioned before in the case of France, again took hold of the English public.

And the English public looked for the defense against the imagined great dangers in a system of alliance. Lord Roberts offered heroic measures; he wanted that England, too, bring those sacrifices which were assumed by all states desirous of being great powers and wishful of insuring their political independence. But the egotism of English society refused to listen to Lord Roberts and turned to the apparently more commodious expedient—the policy of alliances, for which, however, it pays dearer than what would have been the cost of armament.

If England had prepared, she could have upheld her political freedom, her ancient splendid isolation. As it was, however, public sentiment would have it that the power of France be considered the principal defense of England, and that England could in no event tolerate the defeat of France, no matter for what cause there should be war between France and Germany. Smith, Member of Parliament and Unionist writer, states before the war that it is almost universally recognized in England that in her present condition England could not endure the vanquishment of France. These impressions

are so strong that, notwithstanding the improvement in the mood which became noticeable afterwards, England does not dare at the time of the outbreak of the continental war to countenance German victories, but is afraid that, if victorious, the memory of the old discord and the opportunity would prompt Germany to attack England.

One inducement for the war, as Grey argued in Parliament on the eve of hostilities, was the set opinion of the government that participation in the war would hardly be accompanied by greater economic loss than neutrality.

The argument is characteristic and it is a sad fact, that no voice was raised in that most respectable body, the Parliament of Great Britain, to refute that cynic perception which weighs the question of the war on the half-ounce scale as if it were a deal in merchandise.

War in modern times is justified only if it cannot be avoided and is demanded by great vital interests; in that event it is, however, also justified if it demands great material sacrifices. An evitable war must not be begun, even if the material loss is not excessive, for human life must not be sacrificed for anything but the defense of the greatest national values, for a

thing for which one must also be prepared to suffer material loss.

But Grey's superficial argumentation avenged itself. I do not believe that any English statesman would have the hardihood to-day to repeat what the Foreign Secretary asserted before the war. The events clearly showed how wrong Grey's assumption was, and that it will never do to stake the security of a nation on such a deceptive foundation. Innumerable millions have up till now been lost by England in economic articles and warships, which could all have been preserved had she maintained her neutrality. The *Emden's* short but glorious career made Grey's calculations illusory. And how many Englishmen have, besides, been lost on the battlefields of France and Flanders.

And who knows how many bitter surprises still await England during the war, which will all be living refutals of Grey's shopkeeper calculations. Grey, evidently, stood under the effect of memories of the past and did not understand the call of the new era.

During the last century England looked at a great part of her continental wars, as from a theater-box. She fought, to a very great extent, with foreign human material, with soldiers hired

for money. Those times have gone. True, there is an effort made to use Japanese and Portuguese forces to serve English interests strange to them, but this will hardly succeed. Japan succeeded in getting what she wanted, and it is very improbable that she will allow herself to be used for foreign purposes.

Portugal will have too much self-respect to enter the services of another. True, Hindoo troops are also fighting mixed in among African negroes under the command of their oppressors, but all that does not suffice to replace the English. England will be compelled to send the cream of her society to cope against a war-force better organized than her own. Perhaps Grey did not consider the fact either, that he would have to confront the Islamic world, when he spoke so lightly of the risk of war.

But it is all in vain—every phase of a great struggle once started cannot be figured out in advance. Up to date the greatest English statesmen have always studiously avoided to come in conflict with Islam. Now they have thoughtlessly chanced that, too, and thereby put the internal peace of the two greatest British colonies in jeopardy. Generally speaking, the colonial situation is far more dangerous to-day than

at any time in the past. In the past England had to fight at home or against a poorly supported colonial army of a continental power, as in the 18th century against the French in Canada and India, or against an expedition starting from a distant sea coast, such as even the genius of Bonaparte was unable to successfully launch from Egypt against India. This has been changed to-day. At present England herself has become more vulnerable at home—on account of the wonderful aids of modern technics—than she has been only a short time ago. Even the sea does not offer the protection which it did in Napoleonic times, because one can cross it so much quicker. To-day the colonies are endangered partly by the well-organized and brave army of next-door Turkey, and partly by the dissatisfaction of Boer and Mussulman subjects.

Under such circumstances Grey's utterance was frivolous and his nation may have to smart for it.

Neither can I free myself from the suspicion that one of the causes of England's decision ought to be found in her internal political situation, in the thought that only an outside war could prevent civil war in Ireland.

Those motives of England may be understood,

but they are not well placed and do not end the grave responsibility lying heavy on her shoulders now. Because, while it is plausible that after the things that happened, after England had joined the Entente, it was difficult for her to maintain neutrality and to leave her friends in their hour of need and while the argument that in the event of the defeat of her allies England would have become isolated and dangerously situated is not unfounded, yet it cannot be denied that England was brought into the predicament to have to fear Germany's victory, solely by her own fault. There was absolutely no reason why she should have gotten on bad terms with Germany.

Blunders led her into the Entente. The greatest faults of the English nation, all its weaknesses had a hand in her anti-German politics and in their consequence that in contradiction of her tradition she agreed to become enlisted in one of the continental camps. Envy, fear, aversion against the rival and her shrinking from making sacrifices induced her to follow an anti-German policy without real necessity and without the compelling pressure of a great state interest, and to join the anti-German Alliance. The situation so created forced her to start war for wanton fear, the fear that German victory would have dire results for her. Yet

such wars are usually the most dangerous ones. While the party, working in accordance with a set plan, ordinarily choses the right time for an attack, and is, as a rule, strong and listens to the dictates of a cool mind, fear discloses weakness, and calculation is swamped by nervousness.

CHAPTER VII

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE WAR

WHILE I wrote the foregoing chapters I received the English, Russian, and French official documentary collection regarding the premises of the war. Those collections, prepared for their own defense and directed against us, are proofs in our favor and convince everybody that in the diplomatic premises of the war it was also the Entente which was at fault.

The leadership and principal responsibility of the Russian government is proven with documentary evidence by the exchange of telegrams between the Czar and the Servian Crown Prince. Immediately after receiving our note, demanding necessary dispositions in

the matter of the Sarajevo assassination, the Servian government turned to Russia. From her it expected advice and support. This is natural. Servia would never have ventured on the path of aggression had she not figured on Russia; on the other hand, experience had taught her that she cannot unconditionally rely on Russia's constancy, and therefore she felt induced to ask for new instructions from St. Petersburg before taking a final step.

The Servian Crown Prince, in his telegram, leaves the right of decision to the Czar and declares that he is inclined to accept all those of our demands which the Czar approves.

Thereby he places the fate of his country into the hands of the Czar. After that telegram a single nod of the Czar would have been sufficient to insure peace. No intimation was put forward. On June 27th the Czar telegraphs the obedient Prince, that while he desires peace, yet if all efforts should prove to be in vain, "your highness may rest assured that in no event will Russia cease to be interested in Servia's fate."

The Russian government knew beyond the shadow of doubt that this answer meant war, knowing that Servia would not avoid war if she felt Russia's army backing her, and because she also knew from published reports that we

apprehended the disintegration and mutilation of the Monarchy if we are unable to repel Servian aggression for once and all, and that, therefore, we would not give in, either.

The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs with keen foresight declared to the powers of the Entente that Austria-Hungary would not forego any of her demands and that peace could only be assured if Servia could be made to comply. Sasonov also knew that from this clash with us would result the greatest war known to mankind, that Germany would intervene, that his allies would do likewise, but for all that he did nothing to save the world from this extreme peril.

According to the documents Sasonov spoke volubly of his love of peace, and concocted all kinds of schemes of solution and intervention, together with his confederates, but failed to do the one essential thing that could make peace sure; he never once tried to make Servia accept our demands. Every word and act of the Russian government and its entire attitude prove that it had reconciled itself to the war idea and had become the slave of its Eastern ambition.

Had Sasonov intended to preserve the world peace he would not have left the decision to Pasics—to the man whose life purpose it was

to enlist the strength of Russia and of the Entente into the service of the Great Servian idea —here he, himself, would have dictated which of our demands Servia would have to accept. He who would keep the geese will not set the fox to guard them.

Russia could only relinquish her right to determine the *casus belli* and vest that right in little Servia, if war had been decided upon at all hazards, and the only question had been whether the inevitable conflict should begin one or two years sooner.

It can be imagined that a Russian Minister would leave it to Servia when to start a war, which has been decided upon in principle, but it positively cannot be imagined that there should exist a Russian Minister who would leave it altogether to Servia whether to go to war or not.

The offensive purpose of Russia is proven besides by the fact that she is unable to advance any other cause for the war than her set intention to defend Servia's reputation. That may well serve as a subterfuge if war is to be declared, and a better one is lacking, and one must have an excuse for the sake of appearances, but it cannot be looked upon as the true cause.

It is out of the question that a Russian government of peaceful tendencies, which would draw its sword only for vital interests of its own country, would begin a war to defend Servia's reputation. Servia's reputation had more than once been a matter of supreme indifference to Russia, for it is not so long since she endured Servia's humiliation, when after a threatening attitude of many weeks and feverish armament the latter had been compelled to withdraw from her official standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina interfered with her rights, and after a lot of provocation, abuse and insult, to backwater and promise us to act like a peaceful neighbor.

Russia suffered that humiliation of Servia, although thereby she exposed herself to the reproach to have instigated and then forsaken her in the moment of danger.

Why, the frequent assassinations for which the Servians are bearing responsibility have cast many a dark stain on the reputation of their country. And a graver and more irreparable affront was offered to the Karagyorgyevics dynasty by Russia's friend and present ally, England, than by anyone else, when she for years had no envoy at the murder-sullied court of Belgrade.

It cannot be believed that Russia, even in the present conflict, identifies herself with Servia's reputation, for she has not considered her course to be faultless.

Her ally, Grey, plainly states that it is necessary to humble Servia to a certain extent and neither does Sasonov deny that her behavior would justify some retortion on our part.

Thus one is expected to believe, taking Sasonov's explanation seriously, that he entered the conflict because we wanted to humble Servia somewhat more than she had deserved. This is really too absurd for belief. A patriotic Russian government would never dare to risk Russia's existence for such a cause.

Why should Russia bleed for the dignity of Servia, when she did not defend the dignity of Montenegro, her other favorite, when she suffered it, that after fights of months and great losses, we ordered Nikita out of Skutari, the town he had so hotly coveted and which the Czar, himself, had destined for him?

Who is to believe that Sasonov should today want to jeopardize the existence of Russia, for the often-debased dignity of King Peter, when he thought nothing of Montenegro's humiliation, and quite in contrast with his present policy, coldly declared that Russia would fight

for Russian interests only? Who would have thought that the same minister, uttering those words of wisdom, would chance the world-war for the sake of the reputation of Servia?

And what else is it but a mere subterfuge, when Sasonov, to justify the war, is compelled to declare that Servia is to Russia what Belgium is to England.

Only one who is anxious to conceal the truth will resort to such a statement. Why, it lacks all seriousness, for it would not prove the correctness of Russia's procedure, even if it were true. England never made a *casus belli* out of Belgium's dignity, but only in order that she become not the property of a hostile power.

The comparison in itself is untenable. Belgium's relation to England is quite different from that of Servia to Russia. Belgium is the gateway through which an enemy may invade England, through which it is the easiest to attack England. To attack Russia through Servia is altogether impossible. Belgium is in England's immediate vicinity; Servia is several hundred miles from the Russian frontier.

Russia's double dealing is unveiled also by the obstinate stiffness shown by her during the entire negotiation.

The government of the Czar has brought no

sacrifices in the interest of European peace, but from beginning to end persisted on the point of view that it would not countenance that Servia be forced to accept any condition which in Servia's own opinion would assail her reputation as a state, that she would not permit that we defeat Servia and thereby drive her under our influence, that the Servian conflict is an affair for all Europe to settle, in which Russia would say the last word, which would have to be adjusted either by a conference presided over by England, or by negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but not by negotiations with Servia direct. Russia did not yield any of the points she raised.

Before our ultimatum was sent, at the time of the French president's visit to Russia, they had agreed among themselves that they would not consent to any demand of ours which Servia could consider a violation of her sovereignty and independence.

She maintains that attitude throughout, and after the declaration of war, she recapitulates as the cause of the war that Russia "could admit a peaceful solution of the question, only in a measure, which would not include the diminution of the dignity of Servia as an independent state."

Russia proved her love of peace in these critical times by not caring in what manner she gained her ends, whether by international conference, mediation or direct communication. Her purpose remained the same, however, namely, that the splinter stay in our flesh, that Servia, with strength unbroken, remain our enemy and be at all times at Russia's beck and call.

Russia's responsibility for the war is enhanced by the method she employed in the matter of preparation. She took such first decisively hostile steps against another great power, which could not be left unanswered, when mobilizing half of her army against us.

We had not mobilized a single soldier against her and had called out only eight army corps, just what we considered suffieient to defeat the Servian army, estimated at 400,000 men, and Russia replied to that by admittedly mobilizing against us and starting her troops in the direction of our frontiers.

Russia's mobilization was directed exclusively against us for the purpose to make us yield and modify our attitude.

Naturally, nothing was left to us then but to place our whole army in readiness.

And not only against us, but against Germany

as well, did Russia take the first threatening step, when she used our unavoidable action as a subterfuge to mobilize the second half of her army, in spite of the fact that the German government had, in advance, announced to the French and British Ambassadors, that so long as Russia would only mobilize her southern army corps she would make no counter movement, but as soon as the entire Russian army would be mobilized, Germany would be forced to consider such action a hostile move against her, and proceed to defend herself.

When, notwithstanding, Russia mobilized her northern army corps as well, she knowingly aroused Germany, and set the ball rolling, which led to actual war, without having been impelled by considerations of self-defense, because even without the complete mobilization of her army she sent up fourteen army corps against the eight we had at our disposal against her. The very last impetus was given to the world-war by the general mobilization of Russia, as the British Ambassador in Vienna very correctly observes when in his recapitulatory report, written after the outbreak of the war, he states that the consequences of Russia's measures against Austria-Hungary will be found in history's records.

Side by side with the cardinal responsibility of the Czar's government, grave responsibility attaches to France and England, inasmuch as their attitude imbued Russia with the courage to face us. Russian aggressiveness and Eastern ambition were the active promoters of the world-war and its true cause, but such aggressive policy was only made possible by the behavior of her allies.

Russia would not have dared to take up again her Eastern plans and hankerings for expansion after the Japanese fiasco, had she not felt that she would find effective aid in the anti-German feeling and tendency of England and France.

The responsibility of France is documentally proven when Sasonov says that Russia is ready for the dangers of war for Servia's sake, adding, however, "if she feels secure of the support of France," and that France had at once reassured him as to that support. On June 25th the British Ambassador reports from St. Petersburg that he has learned from his French colleague that France is ready to support Russia. On July 29th the French government officially announces that the Republic would fulfil her federal obligations.

England's share in the responsibility also admits of no doubt. Russia's Eastern policy be-

came audacious only when she knew that she need not fear England's hostility. The great intimacy which developed between England and France, the strong hate of everything German in English public opinion and the fact that the general staffs of both countries had come in touch to work out a joint plan of action became the starting point of Russia's more courageous and aggressive policy. King Edward, himself, had been the originator of that political situation, which sooner or later was bound to result in war, by inspiring courage to those who alone in Europe had reason to pursue a policy of offensive, by enhancing the strength of the idea of "Revanche," which put the realization of the Russo-Servian ambition on the order of the day. Russia could not very well let the opportunity slip to fight with England's assistance or at least her well-meaning neutrality, for what up to that moment she thought to be able to achieve only after England's overthrow, and when in addition she could even count, for England's sake, on her Asiatic enemy, Japan. The Russian general Kuropatkin only a few years ago argued against the Balkan ambitions, saying, that while they are plain, their realization would be out of the question, because it would provoke, besides the attack of Turkey and

the central powers, also that of England and Japan.

At present the weightiest argument brought up in support was in all probability, that the neutrality of both countries is certain, their co-operation probable. And it is furthermore probable that the Czar risked the present war, identified himself with Servia's dignity, only after he could take it for certain that England would, for the sake of France, stand by him. The Belgian Envoy at the Russian Court points out that fact, as emphasized by the German Chancellor. On the 27th he writes that the Russians are convinced that the English would defend the French, and that knowledge lends strength to the idea of war. Writings published on the English side confirm that the Belgian Envoy was not mistaken, and that the Russian government, as a matter of fact, counted upon England's help. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses, in presence of the British Ambassador, his conviction that "England would in the end be dragged into war." He repeats his statement on July 25th and 30th, and again says so to the President of the French Republic.

In consequence of this assurance the friendly powers do not insist that England assume an

obligation to participate, but only that she declare her resolution in Berlin, that she come out with the color, face to face with Germany.

From the official acts it can be seen that Grey's attitude was not liable to shake the confidence placed in him in Paris and St. Petersburg. Not once during the French and Russian inquiries do the English statesmen declare that Great Britain would not intervene, but evaded the final issue. On July 24th the English Ambassador answers Sasonov, that his government would not assume an "unconditional" obligation to render assistance, but in his belief it will be inclined to direct the German government's attention to the fact that in the event of a general war, England would hardly be able to preserve neutrality. On July 31st Grey says, "At the present moment we could not undertake any definite engagements."

At the same time Grey admits that France is drawn into the conflict by honor and interest, and goes so far as to inform the German government twice that he could not remain neutral, but would stand by France, and thus he also informs the powers of the Entente.

Grey cannot conceal his actual conviction and inner resolution to take part in the war, as is evident from his telegram to Buchanan, British

Ambassador to Russia, of the 25th, stating, "If, however, war should break out, then its developments would force us to participate."

These declarations of the English government were, therefore, not apt to abate the hopes of France and Russia placed in it, and only created the impression that Grey does not want to incite to war and would not oblige himself to unconditional help, so that he should not in fact cause the war and assume indisputable responsibility for coming events; that sooner or later, however, he would make the cause of France his own. Grey's utterances are all of such nature that had he remained neutral, he would have deserved the reproach that he was not as sincere as one ought to be with friends in such a tragic hour, because not once did he say that he would not enter the fight, although he saw that they were counting on him. Therefore, Grey did nothing to preserve peace.

It acted encouragingly on the Russian government and public opinion that England began to prepare on the 27th, by not permitting her fleet, which had been mobilized for maneuvers, to demobilize. While the fact did not have the significance for us as the mobilization of Russia ordered against us,—because it did not start a counter armament, the end of which was the ul-

timatum and declaration of war,—still it was another firebrand thrown into public feeling, encouraging the war parties in the states of the Entente, and throwing a dubious light on the intentions of the English government.

The official files prove besides, that England did not try any of the means which alone could have preserved peace, for instance, to induce Servia to yield or to hold back Russia from unconditionally aiding Servia. England's whole activity exhausted itself in trying, by roundabout ways and means, to mollify us and induce us to retreat, although that hope was, according to the reports of her own diplomacy, minimal, right from the beginning.

It made a curious impression, how reverently the English, French and Russians acknowledge each other's peace lovingness, when in fact neither of them brought the slightest sacrifice in the interest of peace, each working with might and main that the crisis, which was started by the infamous murder and by revolutionary movements in our land and at our door, may end with our humiliation.

The attitude of the Entente is not favorably illumined by the correspondence published for the purpose of defence, and the picture which even hostile communiques render of

the behavior of the central powers is much more favorable. While the Entente is unable to enumerate a *casus belli* which would be in proportion with the horrors and losses of war, and while it is impossible to assume seriously that really only the argument cited, i. e., the full protection of Servia's dignity, should have guided Russia in her fate-like decision, the causes attributed to us are sufficient to assume any risk and by the documents published by the Entente it can be seen that we saw such interest jeopardized, for which it was our right, our duty, to sacrifice all we possessed. We were not guided by the dignity of other people, not even by our own prestige, we drew our sword for our most vital interests. On July 26th, we announced in St. Petersburg, that it was not our purpose to conquer, that we did not want to violate Servia's integrity, that all we wanted was our "tranquility."

On July 29th, the French government says of our motives, that we are afraid of "interior decomposition," and that is the reason why we want guarantees relative to Servia; we want to punish Servia for the past and receive guarantees as far as her future attitude is concerned. If any motive can be assigned to war at all, let me ask, is it not a sufficient motive

when a foreign state systematically interferes with our internal affairs for the purpose of violating our territorial integrity? Sasonov himself acknowledges (on July 26th), that "The intention which has inspired that document (our note to Servia), is legitimate, if you have no other purpose than to protect your territory against the machinations of the Servian anarchists." He only objects to the means. English diplomacy is also convinced that we felt our position as a great power and our unity as an empire imperilled, and for that reason want to take Servia to task.

Our whole sin in the eyes of the Entente can be at most, that we wanted to defend our legitimate ends, our existence and most vital interests by somewhat more effective means than they thought fair and right and would permit, which is a pardonable offence, for perhaps it is not excessive immodesty, if some government imagines that it knows better how to bring the agitation fomented within its boundaries, to a stop, than a foreign power, and if such government is prone to defend its existence in a somewhat more earnest manner than would its enemies.

While the Entente could cite only such causes to vindicate her own course which, soberly

speaking, could have induced Russia only if she wanted to realize her Eastern ambition and had prepared for war with us in the near future, at any rate, and while her allies stood under the hypnotic spell of German danger and hatred, the causes brought forward by us are of a compelling force and explain our conduct, even in the event, had we purposely pursued a defensive policy excluding all offensive intents.

And while the allegations of the Entente prove that they have not brought any actual sacrifices in the interest of the world's peace, the same statements verify it that we, the offended, the imperiled party, did make very material concessions for its sake. While at first we proclaimed that it would be our intention to stick to all our claims, and that our quarrel with Servia concerned us alone, and was nobody else's affair, wherefore we would accede to no one's intervention, but would settle the attack leveled at our integrity, with Servia direct, later, when we had to apprehend Russian interference, we changed our attitude. We expressed ourselves willing to accept the intervention of the four powers; besides, we opened direct negotiations with Russia and made declaration that even among the terms of peace we would not claim anything that would violate Servia's sov-

ereignty. The Entente expressed its full satisfaction and was in hopes that the affair could be adjusted amicably.

From the documents it transpires furthermore that while we only purposed to bring Servia to account and did not want the world-war, Russia knew quite at the beginning that by her resolution and intervention she would inaugurate the world's most gigantic struggle.

CHAPTER VIII

RECAPITULATION

IN Russia, Asiatic aspirations were replaced by the Balkan ambition.

In one direction the road of the Czar was blocked by Japan; in the other it was opened by England's anti-German policy, which seemed to offer the unexpected opportunity to help to achieve what hitherto had been prevented by English blood and money.

Russia made Servia the base of her Balkan action and espoused the Great-Servian idea, the only medium still unconditionally at the disposal of her upsetting and destructive politics.

When she decided to avail herself of that expedient, she made it manifest that she was prepared for war with Austria-Hungary, for she

adopted an idea that could be realized only through our overthrow.

Possibly the Russian government did not intend to strike in 1914; perchance it would rather have waited for the strengthened Servia to develop further, for her own resources to become more ample, to build strategic railways, to give the French national defense law time to be of fuller effect, and England time to prepare better for the great struggle, before she would become our ruler. Perhaps she would have been satisfied if Great-Servian agitation had steadily kept on undermining our cohesion. But she did take to a road which she could follow in a calm and regular manner only if she was resolved to fight us.

We had seen the danger for a long time. In government circles the suggestion arose more than once that we ought to create order at our southern frontier, and with a strong arm make an end of all hostile agitations; Servia should either be broken or made to change its tendency.

Love of peace was, however, always stronger than our will, and in every clash we were satisfied to counteract immediate danger.

Under such circumstances did the assassination occur which, while not actually planned by

Servia's leading statesmen, was, nevertheless, the bloody result of the official circle's activity.

After that assault we could not procrastinate any longer. The Servian question had to be settled. It would have led to loss of courage, to a final collapse of our self-respect, and to increasing impudence of the Servian provocation, had we further abstained from acting against Servia with comprehensive energy.

Yet even then we could not make up our mind to simple retortion, to just batter down that power which had caused us so much loss and manifested such inimic spirit, which on innumerable occasions would have justified the beginning of a war; still, even then we desired to leave a door open for a pacific solution.

But Russia did not want Servia to enter the gate kept open by us. She was afraid that Servia would forsake her if she would have to undergo humiliation, and Russia would have lost that assistance which, in our case, would be so immeasurably precious, and thus could not have forced us between two fires, when she wished.

This fear caused the war. We would have acquiesced in any solution that could have offered us a guaranty that Servia would change her political tactics, but not that the protec-

tion of the Entente save Servia from a punishment for her assault and from the consequences of her crime, not, that Servia be encouraged to follow her erstwhile path, not, that she go scot-free.

On the other hand, Russia would only countenance a solution which preserves Servia's aggressive will and power. Owing to her own offensive purposes she could not permit that we be relieved from the danger of a two-sided attack. Therefore, she started in the war jointly with Servia, in order not to subject herself to the danger that somewhat later the struggle take place minus Servia.

Our solitary purpose was to ensure our internal peace by putting a stop to the aggression within our own borders, Russia's, however, to keep it up and thereby to improve the prospects of a later war. For this reason did war become imperative.

The Germans supported us with the honesty of their race in our effort to solve the Servian question without European complications and to obtain such guarantees as would prevent a continuation of the former practices. The German Emperor did all he could to localize the issue, but as a true friend, he did not wish to keep us back from asking what we had been in

duty bound to claim. As soon as he saw that the Servian question could not be isolated, that Russia is inclined to risk the war for the prestige of Servia, he knew only one purpose—to conduct the negotiations in such manner that the decision come sooner and enhance the prospects of victory.

Germany could not act differently. She felt that the edge of the Entente's policy was directed against her; if we retreat, the war may be deferred but not avoided, and that such delay purchased by our humiliation would only seal our doom.

In such manner did the world-war begin. Responsible for it are, in the first place Russia, then her allies. We only defended ourselves and, therefore, our conscience is clean and calm.

Let us, from that knowledge, derive courage and perseverance to fight a vigorous and unrelenting battle until peace shall have come again, such peace that can only be God's judgment over those who have committed the greatest sin against civilization, by starting the most devastating and pernicious war known to man's history, without due right and reason, not because they could not have done otherwise, but because such was their evil will.

AUG 20 1916